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QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW
I.
Is the creation of the remedy of "equitable restitution"
by the Court of Appeals in conflict with that Court's previous
holdings

that

an

advanced

degree

is not divisible marital

property pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Anno. § 30-35 (1987)?
II.
Does a trial court have the authority under Utah Code
Ann. § 3 0-3-5 (1987) to allocate income tax exemptions in any
manner that it deems fair and equitable in a divorce action?
III.
Was it an abuse of discretion for the Court of Appeals to
modify the trial court's award of alimony and child support in
light

of

the

inadequacy

of

facts

in the

record

and

that

court's creation of the remedy of equitable restitution?
REFERENCE TO COURT OF APPEALS OPINION
The

opinion

of

the

Court

of Appeals

is

reported

at

Martinez v. Martinez, 80 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (April 26, 1988).
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The decision being reviewed was filed by the Utah Court
of Appeals on April 19, 1988.

No Petitions for Rehearing have

been

No extension of time has been

filed or are pending.

granted in which to Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
1

This

Petition for Writ of Certiorari is filed within 30 days of the
filing of the opinion

of the Court of Appeals.

The Utah

Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-2-3(a) and § 78-2a-4 (1987).
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1987).
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987).
Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1987).
Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238 (Utah App. 1987).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a divorce case.

The parties were married for

seventeen years and have three children.
parties

were

married,

each

had

a

high

At the time the
school

education.

Thereafter, the husband graduated from medical school in 1981;
the parties separated during the husband's internship, and at
the

time

of

residency.

the

trial,

the

husband

was

completing

his

During the course of the marriage, the wife worked

outside the home for a total of three years as a part-time
waitress.

She earned a total of $2,779.

The pertinent provisions of the trial court's ruling are
as follows:
1.
three

The wife was awarded custody of the parties'
children

subject

visitation rights.

to

the

husband's

[Record at 213.]
2

reasonable

2.

The husband was ordered to pay $300 per month

per child as child support (for a total of $900) with
that support to continue until each child reached 21
years subject to a $100 per month per child abatement
should that child come to live with him.

[Record at

213. ]
3.
the

two

youngest.
4.

The husband was awarded the tax exemptions for
older

children

and

the

wife

received

the

[Record at 213-14.]
The husband was ordered to pay to the wife $400

per month alimony for five years, and the award would not
terminate should she remarry in the first three years.
[Record at 214.]
5.

The wife was awarded the marital residence

subject to a lien in the husband's favor payable upon the
occurrence of certain events, but not payable upon her
remarriage.
6.

[Record at 214-15.]

Each party was awarded the personal property in

their respective possessions.
7.

[Record at 215.]

Each party was ordered to pay the debts which

they incurred after their separation and the husband was
ordered to pay approximately $20,000 in student loans.
[Record at 215-16.]
8.

The husband was ordered to pay his attorney's
3

fees and $2,500 to the wife for her attorneys fees and
costs.

[Record at 216.]

The wife then appealed this decision to the Utah Court of
Appeals
Billings

and

the

case

was

and Jackson.

argued

before

Judges

Davidson,

The Court's opinion was written by

Judge Davidson, concurred in by Judge Billings and dissented
from by Judge Jackson.
and remanded.
1.

It affirmed in part, reversed in part

The majority ruled as follows:
It found that the trial court's award of child

support was an abuse of discretion, and then awarded $600
per month per child as child support, (for a total of
$1,800) to continue to age twenty-one if the child is
full-time student and not married.

was

2.

It fourxi that the trial court's award of alimony

an

abuse

of

discretion,

plaintiff permanent alimony

and

then

awarded

the

in the amount of $750 per

month.
3.

In addition to the increased alimony, it held

that the wife was entitled to an award of
restitution"
appropriate

and

amount.

remanded

for

"equitable

determination

In determining

the

of

newly created

concept of "equitable restitution," the Court stated:
We use the term equitable restitution to
describe the award in order to establish a
clear
distinction
between
it
and
traditional alimony or any other form of
4

an

spousal maintenance or support.
The
function of equitable restitution is to
enable a spouse to share the newly
obtained earning capacity of a former
spouse who has achieved that capacity
through the significant efforts and
sacrifices of the requesting spouse which
were
detrimental
to that
spouse's
development.
It is nothing more than an
equitable sharing of the rewards of both
parties' common efforts and expectations.
Martinez v. Martinez, 80 Utah Adv. Rep. 35, 41
1988), (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
4.

(April 19,

It also agreed with the appellant that the trial

court did not have the authority to equitably distribute
the state and federal tax exemptions for the parties'
minor

children

supremacy

as

such

distribution

clause of the United

violated

the

States Constitution in

light of the 1984 Tax Reform Act and the provisions of 26
U.S.C. § 152(e) (1988).

Therefore, the Court held that

under federal law the plaintiff was entitled to claim all
of the exemptions.
5.

Finally, the Court found no abuse of discretion

in the trial court's award of attorney's fees.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
When

the

parties

were

married

on June

6,

1968, Mr.

Martinez was an E-5 in the United States Army [Transcript at
4.]

and

both

parties

only

had

a

high

school

education.

[Transcript at 6.]
From

1968

to

1977, Mr. Martinez
5

remained

continually

employed and was the primary income producer while his wife
only worked part-time for a total of three years between 1968
and 1982, the date of the parties' separation.

[Transcript at

52-53.]
The income of the parties, as presented at trial in Mrs.
Martinez's Exhibit "A" is reflected as follows:
FAMILY INCOME
OTHER
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977

$10,840
11,411
13,324
14,797
15,968

$10,840
11,381
13,323
14,464
13,089

$ 30.36
$ 116
2,663

216.00

MEDICAL SCHOOL
YEAR

TOTAL

1981
1982
1983

$11,248
26,990
35,579

HUSBAND

OTHER

WIFE

64.00
189.00
185.00

In 197 0, Mr. Martinez decided to attend college, and Mrs.
Martinez reluctantly agreed.

[Transcript at 13.]

He applied

to medical school, and he was accepted by the University of
Utah School of Medicine in 1977.

[Transcript at 7.]

Mrs. Martinez was adamantly opposed to Mr. Martinez going
to medical school, and that disagreement almost destroyed the
marriage.

[Transcript at 14, 31 and 33.]

To support his

family and pay for tuition and books during the four years of
undergraduate school and the first year of medical school, Mr.
6

Martinez worked and received benefits from his G.I. Bill.
[Transcript at 35 and 53.]

During this time, he purchased a

home and built an equity which was used to purchase a second
home, which was the residence awarded to the wife in the
divorce action.

[Transcript at 57.]

In addition to these

monies, he received $7,000 from his mother's estate and used
that to pay

family

expenses.

[Transcript at 53.]

Mr.

Martinez also took out three student loans, one of which was
for $20,000 [Transcript at 54.] and all of which he is now
repaying and for which Mrs. Martinez was not held responsible.
[Record at 215.]
During the entire marriage, Mrs. Martinez did not work
except

as

a part-time

waitress

[Transcript at 35 and 53.]

in

1978, 1979 and 1980.

When she worked, Mr. Martinez

stayed home and watched the three children.

[Transcript at 3 0

and 3 5.]
After Mr. Martinez graduated from medical school in 1981,
he

secured

an

internship

at

Danville,

Pennsylvania,

[Transcript at 7] and although Mrs. Martinez was reluctant,
the family moved to Pennsylvania with him.
52 and 55.]

[Transcript at 16,

After six months, Mrs. Martinez returned to Utah

because she was uncomfortable in the setting and missed her
family and friends.

[Transcript at 17.]

Her dissatisfaction

affected Dr. Martinez's work and internship and placed an
7

extreme amount of additional pressure on him.

[Transcript at

19.]
At

the time of trial

working

in May

1985, Mrs. Martinez was

for Mountain Fuel and had just voluntarily gone to

three-quarters time to get an education and spend more time
with the children.

[Transcript at 48 and 59.]

Her net income

was $846 per month

[Transcript at 42] and Mountain Fuel was

going to pay all of the costs of her education..
at 48.]

[Transcript

At trial, her monthly family expenses were $2,056.

[Transcript at 43 and 58.]
Also, at the time of trial, Dr. Martinez had completed
one

year

of

a

two

year

physician in Pennsylvania.

residency

as

an

emergency

[Transcript at 3 and 100.]

room
Under

his two year contract, he earned $100,000 per year, or $8,333
per month.
deduction

His net income was $7,100 per month after the
of

expenses

such

[Transcript at 9-11 and 66.]

as

malpractice

insurance.

He had to put one-half of his

gross earnings in a tax account as he had no tax deductions or
shelters.

[Transcript at 102-03.]

He was paying back his

student loans and had expenses, including a $1,100 temporary
support payment for a total of $4,337.

[Exhibit 3.]

monthly salary after taxes was $4,022.
There

was

no

evidence

in

the

record

His net

[Transcript at 102.J
to

establish

his

employment plans or potential income after his contract ended
8

in 1986.
ARGUMENTS
I.
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD ISSUE BECAUSE
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION CREATING THE
REMEDY
OF EQUITABLE RESTITUTION
IS
INCONSISTENT WITH AND IS A DRASTIC
DEPARTURE FROM PREVIOUS DECISIONS OF THAT
COURT ON AN IMPORTANT QUESTION OF STATE
LAW,
In Martinez v. Martinez, 80 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (April 26,
1988) , the

Court

of

Appeals

"equitable restitution."

created

a

new

remedy

called

Under Martinez, an award of this

type is now to be considered in divorce cases where one spouse
has obtained a professional degree during the marriage, and
the divorce occurs as that spouse begins his/her new career
and is on the threshold of increased earning capacity.

The

court expressly distinguished this new remedy from all other
forms

of

spousal

maintenance

or

support

and

stated

that,

"'[equitable restitution]' is nothing more than an equitable
sharing of the reward

of both parties' common efforts and

expectations."

Id. at 41.

evidently

not

will

An award of equitable restitution

terminate

upon

remarriage

payable in a lump sum or periodically over time.

and

may

be

In addition

to remanding the Martinez case for determination of the amount
of equitable restitution to be awarded her, the court also
awarded Mrs. Martinez permanent alimony in the amount of $750
9

per month based upon Dr. Martinez's increased Scilary.
The practical and realistic effect of this decision is in
conflict with previous rulings by other panels of the Court of
Appeals and the dictum of the Utah Supreme Court.
issue

is whether

an

advanced

degree

subject to division upon divorce.

The basic

is marital property

It was first addressed by

the Court of Appeals in Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237
(Utah App. 1987) .

In Petersen, the trial court had awarded

$1,000 per month alimony, $300 per month per child as child
support for a total of $1,800, and a $120,000 cash settlement
as a property award representing Mrs. Petersen's interest in
her husband's medical degree.
consisting

of

Judge

Orme,

The Court of Appeals panel

Bench

and

Jackson

unanimously

decided that "an advanced degree is or confers an intangible
right which, because of its character, cannot properly be
characterized
spouses."
"[i]n

as property

Id. at 241.

this

State,

subject to division between the

The Court went on to conclude that

traditional

alimony

analysis

is

the

appropriate and adequate method for making adjustments between
the parties in cases of this type."

Id. at 242.

Shortly thereafter, the Court of Appeals followed and
reemphasized the principle of Petersen in Rayburn v. Rayburn,
738 P.2d 238 (Utah App. 1987).

The Rayburn court, again made

up of Judges Orme, Bench and Jackson, stated:
10

Recently this court held that an advanced
degree or professional licence is not
marital property subject to division upon
divorce.
However, an advanced degree
often accompanies a disparity in earning
potential that is appropriately considered
as a factor in alimony analysis.
We
affirm our holding in Petersen and analyze
the instant appeal under the same analysis
applied in that case.
Id. at 240 (citations omitted).
Finally, although it did not have to decide the issue,
the Utah Supreme Court addressed case law from other states
pertaining

to

the

division

of

degrees

as

"property"

upon

divorce in the case of Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah
1988) .

After stating that, in order to do equity in some

factual

instances, a court may have to compensate a spouse

based

on other

legal

and equitable principles, this Court

concluded that, "we agree that an educational or professional
degree is difficult to value and that such evaluation does not
easily

fit

property."
The

the

common

understanding

of

the

character

of

Id. at 1081.

practical

effect

of

the

new

concept

created

in

Martinez is wholely inconsistent with the law as set out in
Petersen. Rayburn and Gardner.

Martinez begins by awarding

Mrs. Martinez an increased amount of permanent alimony based
upon Dr. Martinez's increased earning capacity.

It then also

awarded her an amount of "equitable restitution," a remedy
expressly

distinguished

from

traditional
11

alimony

or

other

spousal support and based on the increased earning capacity of
a spouse as a result of that spouse's professional degree.
Therefore, regardless of its facial characterization, an award
of equitable restitution is an award of an interest in a
marital asset.
Judge Jackson, who concurred in both the Petersen and
Rayburn cases, summed up the inequities and improprieties of
the Martinez decision

in his well reasoned dissent.

He

pointed out that Mrs. Martinez did not provide the financial
capital necessary for her husband to obtain his medical degree
and that here was no evidence that she deferred her own
educational or career plans in order to advance her husband's.
He also noted that the parties had accumulated sufficient real
and personal property from which an appropriate award could
be fashioned.

He went on to say:

On the facts presented in this case, there
are additional reasons why I believe the
majority's disposition of this appeal is
misguided:
(1) equity can be achieved
under current alimony and property
distribution statutes and case law; (2) an
award of equitable restitution coupled
with the majority's generous alimony and
child support awards is double-dipping;
and
(3) an award
of
equitable
restitution, in effect, treats the
professional education as "propeirty"
subject to division upon dissolution of a
marriage.
After outlining his position, Judge Jackson concluded:
Provision

for Mrs. Martinez's needs is
12

best dealt with through a generous but
fair distribution of property and award of
alimony, not through the creation of a
distinctly new form of cleverly disguised
marital property for which there is no
precedent. (footnotes omitted)
As a result, the Martinez decision is in conflict with
previous decisions of the Court of Appeals and this Court on
an important question of state law.
departure from this law.
raised

by

appellant

It represents a drastic

It also represents a theory never

in

the

Courts

below.

Therefore,

certiorari should issue to review its creation and application
to Petitioner.
II.
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD ISSUE BECAUSE
THE HOLDING BY THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT A
TRIAL COURT CANNOT EQUITABLY DISTRIBUTE
TAX EXEMPTIONS IN A DIVORCE ACTION IS IN
CONFLICT WITH UTAH CODE ANN. S 30-3-5 AND
DECISIONS OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT.
On appeal, Mrs. Martinez argued that the supremacy clause
of the United States Constitution, in light of the 1984 Tax
Reform Act and its effect on 26 U.S.C. § 152 (Supp. 1988),
prevents a state court from allocating tax exemptions between
the parties to a divorce action.

She argued that the statute

requires the trial court to award her all three exemptions
and that the only exception

is where the custodial parent

signs a written declaration agreeing to not claim the children
for a tax year in question.

Because she did not sign such a
13

written declaration, she claimed that the trial court abused
its discretion

in awarding

two exemptions

to Dr. Martinez

because the issue was preempted by the federal law under the
provisions of the supremacy clause.
The Court of Appeals agreed and discussed whether Mrs.
Martinez's

amended

complaint

settlement

agreement

wherein

in

1985 preempted

she

could claim the tax deductions.

agreed

an

earlier

that Mr. Martinez

The court concluded that the

complaint did in fact preempt the settlement agreement, and
since there was no other valid agreement, Dr. Martinez did not
fit within

the

only

exception outlined

under

federal

law.

Therefore, Mrs. Martinez was awarded the tax exemptions for
all three children.

This holding is in conflict with Utah

law, and is not supported by the language in § 152.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1987), grants great discretion
to the trial court in divorce matters.

It states, "When a

decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it
equitable

orders

parties."

The case law interpreting this section is equally

broad.

relating

to

the

children,

property

and

In Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144 (Utah 1978), this

Court stated:
In the distribution of the marital estate,
there is no fixed rule or formula.
The
statutory standard is established in
Section 30-3-5, the court may make such
orders in relation to the parties as may
be equitable.
The responsibility of the
14

trial court is to endeavor to provide a
just and equitable adjustment of their
economic resources so that the parties
might reconstruct their lives on a happy
and useful basis.
Id. at 148.
(See also. Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218
(Utah 1980).)
In

the

past,

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

has

held

that

this

authority allows a trial court to determine which party is
entitled

to

children.

the

tax

exemptions

for

the

parties'

minor

In Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987)

the appellant argued that the trial court erred in awarding
the tax exemption to the wife because in her complaint she had
asked the award to be given to him.

The Utah Supreme Court

held that the entitlement to the tax deduction became a matter
of dispute between the parties at trial, and it was proper for
the trial court to consider the issue.
stands

for

authority

the

proposition

to equitably

that

award

the

The Newmeyer case

trial

and distribute

court

has

the

tax exemptions

between the parties to a divorce action.
In addition, 26 U.S.C. § 152 does not limit this broad
authority of the trial court.

This section is included in

the appendix to this Petition.

It simply requires that a

custodial parent sign a written declaration stating he or she
will

not

claim

the

child

as

a

dependent

and

then

the

noncustodial parent must attach this to his or her return.
The

federal

law

does

not

prohibit
15

a

state

court

from

determining

an equitable distribution of tax exemptions and

ordering a custodial spouse to execute the required form.
Therefore, the Martinez decision
inconsistent with Utah law.

on tax exemptions is

Because the holding is a drastic

departure from established law on an important issue of state
and federal law, certiorari should be granted as to this issue
also.
III.
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD ISSUE BECAUSE
THE COURT OF APPEALS' MODIFICATION OF
ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT AWARDS IS
INCONSISTENT WITH ACCEPTED APPELLATE
PRACTICES AND PREVIOUS RULINGS OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS AND THE UTAH SUPREME
COURT.
In

Martinez,

the

trial

court

awarded

Mrs.

Martinez

alimony in the amount of $400 per month for five years and the
award was made non-terminable should she remarry in the first
three

years.

It

also

ordered

Dr. Martinez

to pay

child

support of $300 per child per month for a total of $900 until
each child reached 21 years.
The Martinez case held that these awards were too low and
constituted

an

abuse

of

discretion.

However,

instead

of

remanding this issue, the Court of Appeals modified the child
support award

to $600 per month per child

for a total of

$1,800 per month and awarded Mrs. Martinez permanent alimony
of $750 per month.

As the dissent of Judge Jackson correctly
16

points out, there was insufficient evidence in the record to
enable

the

Court

modifications

and

of

Appeals

that

the

to

properly

proper

forum

make
to

these

make

any

adjustments would be the trial court.
Therefore, this decision is inconsistent with the law and
standard judicial practices.
appellate

review

that

an

It is a well accepted tenent of
appellate

matters not in the record before it.

court

cannot

consider

This Court, in Reliable

Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 14
Utah

2d

169,

380

P.2d

135

(1963),

stated

"Under

simple

principles of appellate review, we cannot consider matters not
on the record before the trial court, absence of which was
made apparent on examination of the record filed with this
Court."

Id.

In Martinez, the Court of Appeals did not follow these
principles of appellate review.

First, the court modified the

support awards based on Dr. Martinez's gross income under a
two year contract of which he had already worked one year at
the time of trial and which had expired 2 years before the
Martinez opinion.

At the time of trial, Dr. Martinez had not

yet been board certified, and there was no evidence presented
as to his

future

employment

or potential

completed his residency in 1986.

income

after he

In addition, as outlined by

the dissent, the only evidence as to need was Mrs. Martinez's
17

estimate of hers and the childrens' expenses.

The majority

disregarded this figure as too low and made what the dissent
termed as an "independent estimate" of need. (80 Utah Adv.
Rep. at 44) .

The lack of necessary evidence should have led

the court to remand the case for a determination of need and
Dr. Martinez's ability to pay after reviewing all of the
parties' circumstances.
The

error

as

to

the

alimony

and

child

support

modification is even more serious in light of the court's
remand

to

determine

restitution."

a

further

award

of

"equitable

Consequently, the discretion of trial court

will be severely restricted because the appellate court has
locked in the alimony and child support awards.

As correctly

stated by Judge Jackson in his dissent, "This action deprives
the trial court, on remand, of any flexibility to adjust the
debts, property, alimony and support awards and to fashion an
overall award package that harmonizes all the variables.
trial

court's

discretion

will

be

so

equitable outcome will be impossible."

restricted

that

The
an

Id. at 44.

Thus, the unilateral fixing of increased amounts of child
support and alimony is contrary to the law of this Court and
accepted

judicial

practices.

Certiorari

should

issue to

review the decision by the Court of Appeals and correct the
errors committed by that Court.
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CONCLUSION
Under

Utah

law:

(1)

a

professional

degree

is

not

considered a marital asset subject to division in a divorce
action; (2) a trial court has broad discretionary authority to
enter orders to achieve equity in a divorce action, including
but not limited to making orders for the distribution of tax
exemptions

for minor

children; and

(3) an appellate

court

cannot render a decision based on matters or evidence not in
the record.
The decision

of the Court of Appeals

in Martinez

Martinez, supra, is contrary to these principles.

v.

An award of

"equitable restitution" is, for all practical purposes, the
same as treating

a professional

degree as a marital asset

subject to division upon divorce.

This is especially true in

the Martinez

case when the Court of Appeals directed that

"equitable restitution" be made and also increased the alimony
award based on Mr. Martinez's increased income as a result of
his degree.

Second, in awarding Mrs. Martinez the three tax

exemptions, the holding in Martinez strips Utah trial courts
of any authority to consider tax exemptions as a part of the
overall

financial

package

that

parties in a divorce action.
unilaterally

modified

the

must

be

created

for

the

Finally, the Court of Appeals

trial

court's

child

support

and

alimony awards without sufficient evidence before it to do so.
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The

holdings

in Martinez

are

in

conflict

with

and

represent a drastic departure from Utah statutory law and case
law as established by this Court and the Court of Appeals.
Because the issues are important questions of state law and
serious and substantial inequities have occurred, a Writ of
Certiorari should issue.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this P

~ day of May, 1988.
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80UtahAdv Rep 33
29 Utah 2d
in the future nhat she is unable to work
enl
5 Appellant's counsel advised the trial
court that hr$ assistant was present at
trial to help him with witness and
WE C O N C U R :
exhibit management The court advised
Richard C. Davidson, Judge
counsel that it did not intend to allow
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
him to receive credit for that work, since
that was precisely the bailiffs job
! Although the court's order with respect to the
There is nothing in the record to suggest
adult child was only "temporary" until the court
that the court categorically refused to
received an evaluation of her condition by Davis
consider the pre-trial work performed
County Mental Health, the record contains no such
by the legal assistant in determining the
report or any ruling or further order of the court
reasonable atitorney fee in this case
modifying or terminating this provision of the
Because of this, we need not reach the
decree, which neither party has objected to on
issue of whether a trial court must take
appeal
into account the time expended by
2 The decree attributes present and future work and
counsel's legal assistant in determining a
income to Mrs Rasband with which she is expected
reasonable attorney fee
to provide ongoing support for herself and her adult
daughter The court, however, made no specific
earning capacity finding, I e , a dollar amount the
trial court believes she is capable of earning
Cite as
monthly She needs such a "baseline" in order to
80 Utah Adv. Rep. 35
seek a modification of alimony in the future by
showing a substantial change in circumstances if, in
IN T H E
fact, she does not or cannot obtain work providing
U T A H COURT OF A P P E A L S
that level of income See Higlcy v Higley, 676 P 2d
379, 382 n 1 (Utah 1983) On the other hand,
Karen C. MARTINEZ,
without such a specific finding, any income she does
earn from employment will show improved circum
Plaintiff and Appellant,
stances on her part, supporting a request by respov.
ndent to lower his alimony obligation She should Jess M. MARTINEZ,
not be thus penalized, at least until her earnings
Defendant and Respondent.
exceed the baseline amount the trial court contemplated she could and would make when the decree
Before Judges Jackson, Billings and
was entered See Canning v Canning, /44 P 2d 325,
Davidson.
327 (Utah App 1987)
It is obvious that many circumstances of the
N o . 860159-CA
parties could change materially in eight years or less
FILED: April 19, 1988
Accordingly, we think decreasing alimony-based
on speculation about a future ability to earn-is
S E C O N D DISTRICT
generally inappropriate in view of the court's contHonorable Rodney S Page
inuing jurisdiction to modify an original decree
under Utah Code Ann §30-3 5(1987)
ATTORNEYS
3 Even if she secured full time employment at the
Neil C Crist for Appellant
federal minimum wage Mrs Rasband would only
Yasemin M Salahor, Paul H
earn a gross income of SI34 per week, approxima
tely $536 per month After taxes are taken out,
Liapis for Respondent
these earnings plus the alimony awarded by the trial
Kent M Kasting for Respondent
court do not even meet her basic monthly needs of
$1,250-$ 1,400
OPINION
4 See Higlcy, 676 P 2d at 382
On remand, the trial court must consDAVIDSON, Judge:
ider whether the appellant has the ability
to earn enough to supplement the perP l a i n t i f f a p p e a l s f r o m "a d e c r e e of
manent alimony award to a level consi
stent with the guidelines s«t forth by this
divorce entered by the Second District
Court for determining a reasonable
Court
We affirm in p a r t , reverse in
alimony award If the trial court finds
part, and remand
that the appellant does not have this
ability, then it should modify its award
FACTS
of permanent alimony accordingly If
The parties were married on June 22, 1968,
the trial court believes that the appellant
subsequently, three children were born At the
does have this abihtv, then it should
time of marriage, both plaintiff and defendant
make such a finding of fact Absent a
I
were high school graduates and defendant
finding regarding the appellant's ability
was serving as an enlisted man in the U S
to work, the appellant would be preclArmy After defendant's discharge from the
uded in the future from asking the court
s e r v i c e , he a c c e p t e d
employment
to modify her alimony award based on
changed circumstances if she can show
3 (1984). See Heltman v Heltman,
444, 5! l P . 2 d 720(1973)
Norman H . Jackson, Judge
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at Hill Air Force Base, Utah where
he worked as an instrument repair
mechanic with an annual gross
salary of approximately $10,000 00
Defendant began his higher education in 1970 Defendant testified the
parties discussed his pursuit of a
degree and that plaintiff thought it
was a "good idea" but that she
"wasn*t terribly in favor of it"
because it would be time consuming Plaintiff testified she was in
favor of the decision because the
family would "have a better
future " Defendant completed his
undergraduate program five and
one-half years later During this
phase of his education, defendant
supported the family on his wages
and G I Bill benefits Plaintiff gave
birth to children in 1970, 1971, and
1975
While an undergraduate, defendant decided
to apply to medical school The parties agree
that defendant's application to medical school
threatened their marriage Plaintiff was con
cerned that defendant's lack of employment
during four years would be financially detn
mental to the family and that medical school
would severely limit defendant's ability to
"spend much time" with the children and
plaintiff Seeing that defendant was adamant,
plaintiff agreed to "stick by him" during the
next four years believing that, as a result of
their mutual sacrifices, the family would eve
ntually enjoy a higher standard of living
Defendant entered medical school in 1977
and graduated in 1981 Family support was
derived from student loans, savings, the rem
ainder of defendant's G I Bill entitlement,
$7,000 00 from defendant's mother's estate,
and income from plaintiffs part time emp
loyment
Upon completion of medical school, defendant accepted an internship in Pennsylvania
Plaintiff reluctantly left Utah The family's
first residence in Pennsylvania was in an isol
ated location with no telephone and no play
mates for the children The family then rented
a home in a larger town and plaintiff sought
employment to supplement defendant's salary
as an intern Plaintiff testified that she found
a position at a fast food restaurant but defe
ndant did not want her to work there because
it would be embarrassing Because of the fn
ction between the parties and defendant's
admitted relationship with another woman,
plaintiff requested they seek marital counseling
but defendant refused Because of plaintiff's
lack of prospects for suitable employment in
Pennsylvania and the marital discord, plaintiff
and the children returned to the family home
in Utah to wait for defendant to finish his
medical training Although plaintiff unders
tood defendant intended to practice medicine

v. Martinez
Adv Rep 35

COOE«CO
Provo Utah

in Utah, defendant completed his training and
accepted employment in Pennsylvania
Plaintiff filed a verified complaint for
divorce on February 15, 1983 In a stipulation
and separation agreement, signed by the
parties and filed with the court on July 29,
1983, plaintiff agreed defendant could claim
federal tax exemptions for two of the children
while she retained the exemption for the third
child The settlement agreement also recognized the need to "make appropriate adjustments" in the support agreement in the event of
future changes in financial circumstances
After plaintiff hired new counsel, she filed a
verified amended complaint in November
1983, in which the distribution of the tax
exemptions remained the same On May 9,
I 1985, however, plaintiff filed a motion for
I leave to amend the complaint which was subsequently granted This amendment listed
defendant's salary as $100,000 00 per annum
and requested that the child support and
alimony awards reflect the significant increase
in defendant's income Plaintiff requested
attorney fees and costs which would reflect the
current state of the litigation as opposed to
that anticipated in 1983 Plaintiff also reque
sted the trial court to strike the previously
proposed distribution of federal tax exempt
ions for the children
Trial to the court was held on May 31,
1985 The decree of divorce awarded custody
of the children to plaintiff subject to reason
able visitation Plaintiff received $300 00 per
month per child in child support subject to an
abatement of $100 00 per month per child in
the event that a child should live with defen
dant for an extended period The distribution
of tax exemptions was as initially agreed in the
stipulation and separation settlement Alimony
was awarded in the amount of $400 00 per
month for a period of five years being nont
erminable for a period of three years even if
plaintiff remarried Plaintiff was awarded
attorney fees in the amount of $2,500 00
Plaintiff was also awarded the home subject to
a mortgage and an equitable lien in favor of
defendant for the sum of $17,528 00 payable
upon the occurrence of enumerated, future
contingencies The award of the home to
plaintiff necessitated that she continue to
make monthly mortgage payments of $309 00
Plaintiff presents the following issues for
review (1) did the award to defendant of the
two tax exemptions violate federal law, (2)
were the awards of attorney fees, child
support, and alimony so inadequate as to
constitute an abuse of discretion, and (3) is
defendant's medical degree marital property
subject to division9
DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME TAX
EXEMPTIONS
Plaintiff contends the distribution of state
and federal income tax exemptions for two of
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the children to defendant violates the Supre- I her and the failure of defendant to establish
macy Clause of the U. S Constitution in light any exception to the general rule stated above.
of the 1984 Tax Reform Act and its effect on
AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES
26U.SC.§l52(e)(1988) «
Plaintiff
argues the trial court abused its
Subsection 152(e)(1) describes the normal
situation where a custodial parent claims the discretion in awarding attorney fees of only
tax exemption for a child An exception is $2,500 00 when she asked for $7,871.00. Plaprovided in subsection 152(e)(4)(A). The intiff clearly demonstrated a need for assistnoncustodial parent may claim the exemption j ance. The court recognized that need by
when there is a qualified pie-1985 instrument making the award However, the court consibetween the parents which states that the | dered a written statement of attorney fees as a
noncustodial parent shall be entitled to the j basis for the award Extensive fees were genexemption for the child and that parent pro- j erated by tmerest and preparation of the
vides at least $600 00 yearly for the child's I expert testimony offered to support the valusupport The definition of a qualified pre- ation of the medical degree. That argument
1985 instrument is stated in subsection was rejected by the lower court. We find no
abuse of discretion in the award.
152(e)(4)(B) as.
Because defendant did not cross appeal on
For purposes of this paragraph, the
this issue, we do not consider whether there
term "qualified pre-1985 instruwas sufficient evidence presented to the trial
ment" means any decree of divorce
court to justify any award of attorney fees
or separate maintenance or written
Newmeyer v Newmeyer, 745 P 2d 1276 (Utah
agreement —
1987)
(l) which is executed before January
AWARD OF CHILD SUPPORT
1,1985,
Utah Code Ann §§78-45-3,-4 (1987)
(u) which on such date contains the
establish the obligation of both parents to
provision described in subparagraph
support their children and "la] child's right to
(A)(i), and
that support is paramount " Woodward v
(in) which is not modified on or
Woodward, 709 P 2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985).
after such date in a modification
The Utah Supreme Court continued "The trial
which expressly provides that this
paragraph snail not apply to such
iI court may fashion such equitable orders in
relation to the children and their support as is
decree or agreement
The parties stipulated to the distribution of reasonable and necessary, considering not only
the tax exemptions for the children in a sepa- the needs of the children, but also the ability
of the parent to pay " Id Plaintiff contends
ration agreement filed with the court in 1983
The distribution was incorporated in the ver- the award of $300 00 per month per child was
so inordinately low that it constituted an abuse
ified amended complaint also filed that year
Subparagraphs (I) and (u) of subsection of discretion by the trial court We agree
The trial court found defendant's gross
152(e)(4)(B) are satisfied by the 1983 filings
There was no written modification prior to income was $100,000 00 per annum or
January 1, 1985, which expressly revoked the $8,333 00 per month, at the time of the
distribution of tax exemptions during the divorce, while it determined plaintiffs gross
period the stipulation and separation agree- income was $1,033 00 per month 2 The court
ment was in effect Therefore, defendant was found that plaintiff had monthly expenditures
entitled to the two exemptions as stipulated of $2,050 00 and was in need of financial
assistance from delendant to assist the chilprior to the entry of the decree of divorce
However, plaintiffs amended complaint in dren "in maintaining a standard of living more
1985 put the distribution of tax exemptions at comparable to that enjoyed by their father "
Assuming the three children spend the
issue in the divorce proceeding The provisions
of the separation agreement were no longer majority of the year with plaintiff, her gross
effective Plaintiff requested the tax exempt- monthly income, including awarded child
ions for all three children but the trial court's support and alimony, is $2,333 00 After taxes
order did not honor that request This result is have been deducted from the portions of
contrary to the general provisions of section income subject to taxation, plaintiffs net
152(e) Any argument that the stipulation and monthlv income approximates her meager
separation agreement qualifies as a pre-1985 monthly expenses leaving no leeway for emeinstrument, where plaintiff willingly relinqui- rgencies, presently necessary replacement
shes her right to the exemptions under federal expenditures, or any amenities of life Under
law, neglects plaintiffs rejection of its terms such grim economic reality, the children who
in the post-divorce period By amending her reside with their mother will not enjoy a stacomplaint, plaintiff modified and affirmatively ndard of living remotely comparable to that of
rejected the pre divorce distribution Plaintiff their father
The award established by the trial court
is entitled to the tax exemptions for all of the
children in view of the award of custody to cannot be justified when applying the factors
CODE • co
Provo Utah
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listed in Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7(2) I etion." English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 410
(1987).* We find plaintiff and her children are (Utah 1977). The Utah Supreme Court in that
left in a precariously balanced financial exist- often quoted case states that "the most impence while defendant is relatively affluent. ortant function of alimony is to provide
Plaintiff and the children are in great need of support for the wife as nearly as possible at
assistance. The defendant has no responsibility the standard of living she enjoyed during
for the support of anyone other than plaintiff, marriage, and to prevent the wife from becoming a public charge." Id. at 411. The Court
the children, and himself.
At the present time the courts of this state continued that a trial court should consider
do not have uniform guidelines to employ in "the financial conditions and needs of the
determining an award of child support.4 Many wife, the ability of the wife to produce a sufother jurisdictions, however, have established ficient income for herself; and the ability of
child support guidelines or schedules, based the husband to provide support." Id, at 411upon current economic data as to the cost of 12.
rearing children, to be used by trial courts.
In Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah
Although we do not use the numbers or app- 1985), the Court conducted an extensive anaroaches in fashioning the award in this case, a lysis of these three factors. Although the trial
general comparison illustrates the inadequacy judge carefully considered the factors outlined
of the award. Because these formulas are in Jones, because plaintiff and the children
based upon adjusted incomes, we cannot dir- were living in an artificially depressed standard
ectly compare the numbers. Nevertheless, it is of living, the award of only $400.00 per
clear that under each, the support would be month of terminable alimony is inadequate.
much higher. For example, in Colorado, an ! We refuse to penalize plaintiff for trying to
income shares guideline state, the award would live within her means and failing to show
be approximately $1,535.00. Under Wisco- higher necessary expenses.*
nsin's Child Support Guidelines, which were
An application of one of the English stanrecently adopted by our neighboring states of dards could justify the award made in this
Idaho and Nevada, where only the noncusto- case. Plaintiff endured a poor standard of
dial parent's income is considered and where living during the marriage. She had little
29% of gross income is the presumptive money to spend then so she should have little
award, the child support for the three children now. That result will preserve "the standard of
would be $2,320.00.
living she enjoyed during marriage." But such
Under the economic circumstances of this a result is unfair. A divorce court is a court of
case, the award of child support is inequitable equity. It is not equitable to preserve the
and must be modified. The dissent argues the status of limited income for one party and
case must be remanded to determine the chil- affluence for the other when the one sacrificed
dren's need and the ability of each party to to help the other achieve such affluence. When
pay child support. We note the findings of the totality of the English standards are
fact do not fully address the child support applied the award is clearly inadequate.
factors. However, we believe this not to be
The court below also abused its discretion in
reversible error because the totality of the limiting the award of alimony to a period of
factual evidence in the record is "clear, unco- five years; being nonterminable by reason of
ntroverted, and capable of supporting only a remarriage for three years. In Olson v. Olson,
finding in favor of the judgment" of the need 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme
for child support. Acton v. Deliran, 131 P.2d Court analyzed a similar fact situation wherein
996, 999 (Utah 1987); Marchant v. Marchant, the plaintiff wife was a high school graduate
743 P.2d 199, 202 (Utah App. 1987). The and had spent the majority of the marriage
record is also replete with the financial needs bearing and rearing the parties' six children.
of the children and the relative abilities of Defendant husband was a well paid consultant
plaintiff and defendant to meet those needs. who provided his services to governmental
Nothing could be gained by a remand for this agencies on a contract basis. While affirming
purpose except a delay of the increased award, j the award of alimony in the amount of
Based upon the above reasoning, we award the $1,600.00 per month, the Court modified the
sum of $600.00 per month per child, support award by striking its two-year limitation and
to continue to age 21 if the child is a full time making the alimony permanent subject to
student and not married.5 On remand, the trial future changed circumstances. In support of
court shall enter its order for child support in its modification, the Court pointed to the
accordance with Utah Code Ann. §30-3- wife's limited education, her lack of work
5.1(1987).
experience, and that she had "no reasonable
expectation of obtaining employment two
AWARD OF ALIMONY
years hence that will enable her to support
The standard of review relating to alimony herself at a standard of living even approacrequires that we not disturb the trial court's hing that which she had during the marriage."
award unless "such a serious inequity has Id. at 567. See also Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d
resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discr- 96, 103 (Utah 1986).
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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For the reasons stated previously and based
upon the facts in the record, we hold that
plaintiff is entitled to an award of alimony on
a continuing basis and we award permanent
alimony in the sum of $750.00 per month
subject to the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§30-3-5(1987).
THE MEDICAL DEGREE AND AWARD
OF EQUITABLE RESTITUTION
We next must determine whether defendant's medical degree is marital property
subject to division. In the recent case of Gardner
v. Gardner,
748 P . 2 d 1076 ( U t a h
1988), the Utah Supreme Court discussed this
problem and noted that there is authority
from other jurisdictions on both sides of the
issue. However, this Court, in Petersen v.
Petersen, 737 P.2d 237, 239-42 (Utah App.
1987) and Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238,
240 (Utah App. 1987), analyzed the issue and
held that a medical degree is not marital property subject to division in a divorce decree.
We agree with the Utah Supreme Court "that
an educational or professional degree is difficult to value and that such a valuation does
not easily fit the common understanding of
the character of property." Gardner, 748 P.2d
at 1081. The Court in Gardner was not required to address the issue because there was
significant other property accumulated during
the marriage resulting from the increased
earning capacity afforded by the medical
degree and the numerous years the Gardners
enjoyed the standard of living afforded by the
medical degree. That is not the case here. The
Court noted, "The cases which have refused to
hold that professional degrees and practice
constitute marital property subject to valuation and distribution have nonetheless assessed
and divided the value of the degree or practice
on the basis of other legal and equitable
remedies." Id. at 1080-81. The Court described the common fact pattern applicable to
this acknowledgment of the degree's equitable
worth as a situation where "the husband is
supported throughout a long graduate or
professional program by the working wife,
and the couple is divorced soon after graduation. In such cases, there are few marital
assets to distribute, and the courts have considered other ways of compensating the
spouse." Id. at 1081. This is essentially the
situation presented here. While this marriage
has continued for many years the only assets
are the home and the enhanced earning capacity of defendant. The earning capacity must
be recognized in fashioning those "legal and
equitable remedies" necessary to assist plaintiff
to readjust her life. The valuation and distribution of the medical degree in this case is not
a viable alternative. Valuation would be speculative in the extreme, and distribution
ignores the fact that the degree is personal to
defendant.7 We prefer to follow the majority
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rule, upheld in Petersen and Rayburn, that a
medical degree is not subject to valuation and
distribution in a divorce. However, this case is
a striking example of a highly paid professional disposing of his wife with a minimum
amount of support just as that professional is
reaching a level of income for which both the
professional and his wife have striven. This
prevents the wife from enjoying the benefit of
her labor and sacrifice in support of her
husband's goals. See generally L. Wcitzman,
The Divorce Revolution, ch. 5, 124-35
(1985).
From the time of the marriage in 1968 until
their separation in 1982, the parties enjoyed
few of the material pleasures of life. The court
found that "During the 14 years that the
parties lived together, plaintiff assisted extensively in Defendant's obtaining a college
education, medical degree and internship. In
addition, plaintiff made substantial sacrifices
in order to facilitate the completion of Defendant's medical schooling and internship." 1
Plaintiff accepted the sacrifices necessary to
support defendant's aspirations in anticipation
of future benefits. The trial record shows the
following exchange:
Q. Okay. Was there any discussion
of future benefits that would be
obtained through this?
A. Yes. He (defendant] told me that
if I would sacrifice, and if I would
see it through, that someday he
would make it up to me and we
would have material items that we
had gone without. And his hours
would be flexible and he would
have more time to spend with
himself and the children. If we
would just be patient.
Defendant offered no rebuttal to the exchange.
This Court in Petersen, 737 P.2d at 242,
foresaw the situation now at issue. Writing for
the Court, Judge Orme recognized that an
occasion might arise whereby one spouse was
reaching a high level of income just at the
time of divorce rather than the more frequent
situation in which the parties had enjoyed the
benefits of the husband's medical education
for a number of years. Judge Orme wrote:
In cases like the instant one, life
patterns have largely been set, the
earning potential of both parties
can be predicted with some reliability, and the contributions and
sacrifices of the one spouse in enabling the other to attain a degree
have been compensated by many
years of the comfortable lifestyle
which the degree permitted. Traditional alimony analysis works nicely
to assure equity in such cases.

UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

40

wj

In another kind of recurring case,
typified by Graham [In re Marriage
of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574
P.2d 75 (1978)], where divorce
occurs shortly after the degree is
obtained, traditional alimony analysis would often work hardship
because, while both spouses have
modest incomes at the time of
d i v o r c e , the one is on the
[threshold] of a significant increase
in earnings. Moreover, the spouse
who sacrificed so the other could
attain a degree is precluded from
enjoying the anticipated dividends
the degree will ordinarily provide
.... In such cases, alimony analysis
must become more creative to
achieve fairness, and an award of
"rehabilitative" or "reimbursement"
alimony, not terminable upon
remarriage, may be appropriate. See,
e.g., Haugan v. Haugan, 117
Wis.2d 200, 343 N.W.2d 796
(1984); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91
N J . 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982).
Id. at n.4. This is the situation where our
analysis "must become more creative to
achieve fairness." Id Equity demands a recognition of the sacrifices and contributions
made by plaintiff in support of defendant's
medical education. The defendant has been
enriched by plaintiffs efforts and, therefore,
plaintiff has earned an award of some permanent financial benefit, in her own right, that
will allow her to share in the economic benefits achieved through their joint efforts. The
modified award of traditional alimony merely
maintains plaintiff on a plane modestly above
that experienced by the parties during the
marriage. Even this modest award may be lost
through the happening of some future circumstance.9 The dissent would restrict plaintiff
to an award of traditional alimony based upon
defendant's newly acquired level of income.
Because there has been little property accumulated and because the income was acquired
after separation, plaintiff is entitled to a more
permanent remedy.
This issue has engendered much case law.
Many courts have held that a professional
degree is not marital property subject to distribution but nevertheless believe some remedy
must be created for the spouse who supported
the attainment of that degree. A threshold
factor is the meaning of "support" when the
term is applied to the efforts of the nonprofessional spouse. Must "support" equate to
direct financial assistance provided through
full time employment while the student spouse
devotes his or her full time efforts to course
work? Is "support" rendered by a spouse
whose full time activities are devoted to providing a home environment for the student
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spouse and family? Here, plaintiff bore the
children, was the principal in providing child
care and maintaining the domestic setting, and
was also employed part-time for several years
while defendant attended medical school. To
hold that plaintiffs only value is the income
she generates ignores the value of her contributions in every other aspect of family life.
The logical conclusion is that motherhood and
nurturing of children is valueless; that preserving and maintaining a home is worthless;
that the functions of mother, homemaker, and
helpmate contribute nothing of value to a
family. We refuse to so limit our definition of
support. Certainly, our Supreme Court in
analyzing traditional property distributions has
never limited a wife to recovering only what
I she monetarily contributed to the marriage.
Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417 (Utah 1986). We
hold in accordance with the court's finding
that plaintiff contributed to and supported
defendant's educational achievements.
The case law remedies in this situation establish a spectrum, from those narrowly focusing on financial support provided to the
professional spouse, while he or she was a
student, to those which consider the totality of
the non-professional spouse's efforts in the
family venture to obtain economic stability
through education. For example, in Hubbard,
603 P.2d at 747, the wife was allowed to
recover from her physician husband contributions to his direct support, school and professional training expenses, plus reasonable
interest and adjustments for inflation.
A case recognizing more than strict financial
contributions is Saint-Pierre v. Saint-Pierre,
357 N.W.2d 250 (S.D. 1984), in which the
Supreme Court of South Dakota held, "in a
proper case," the trial court should consider
"all relevant factors" in awarding
"reimbursement or rehabilitative alimony."
These included "the amount of the supporting
spouse's contributions, his or her foregone
opportunities to enhance or improve professional or vocational skills, and the duration of
the marriage following completion of the
nonsupporting spouse's professional education." Id. at 262.
In Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wash.2d
168, 677 P.2d 152, 159 (Wash. 1984), the
Supreme Court of Washington listed and
analyzed several factors the trial court must
consider "in determining the proper amount of
compensation for the supporting spouse."
These include the supporting spouse's contributions for direct educational costs, no more
than one-half what the couple would have
earned had "the efforts of the student spouse
not been directed towards his or her studies,"
"[a]ny educational or career opportunities
which the supporting spouse gave up in order
to obtain sufficiently lucrative employment, or
to move to the city where the student spouse
wished to attend schoolf,]" and "(tjhe future
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earning prospects of each spouse, including
the earning potential of the student spouse
with the professional degree. *
Wisconsin statutes allow a trial court to
grant an order requiring maintenance payments to either party after considering several
factors. Among these are:
(4) The educational level of each
party at the time of marriage and at
the time the action is commenced.
(5) The earning capacity of the
party seeking maintenance, including educational background, training, employment skills, work
experience, length of absence from
the job market, custodial responsibilities for children and the time
and expense necessary to acquire
sufficient education or training to
enable the party to find appropriate
employment.
(€) The feasibility that the party
seeking maintenance can become
self-supporting at a standard of
living reasonably comparable to
that enjoyed during the marriage,
and, if so, the length of time necessary to achieve this goal.
(8) Any mutual agreement made by
the parties before or during the
marriage, according to the terms of
which one party has made financial
or service contributions to the other
with the expectation of reciprocation or other compensation in the
future, where such repayment has
not been made, or any mutual
agreement made by the parties
before or during the marriage concerning any arrangement for the
financial support of the parties.
(9) The contribution by one party to
the education, training or increased
earning power of the other.
Wis. Stat. §767.26 (1982), See also Haugan v.
Haugan, 117 Wis.2d 200, 343 N.W.2d 796,
800-01 n.4 (Wis. 1984).
Clearly, some jurisdictions require courts to
examine and value the contributions to a
marriage partner's development. This appears
to be the fair and equitable approach. Therefore, we hold that plaintiff is entitled to an
award of "equitable restitution* in addition to
traditional alimony. We use the term equitable
restitution to describe the award in order to
establish a clear distinction between it and
traditional alimony or any other form of
spousal maintenance or support. The function
of equitable restitution is to enable a spouse to
share the newly obtained earning capacity of a
former spouse who has achieved that capacity
through the significant efforts and sacrifices of
the requesting spouse which were detrimental
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to that spouse's development. It is nothing
more than an equitable sharing of the rewards
of both parties' common efforts and expectations.1*
Factors to be analyzed in determining an
award of equitable restitution include, but are
not limited to: (1) the length of the marriage;
(2) the financial contributions and personal
development sacrifices made by the requesting
spouse; (3) the duration of these contributions
and sacrifices during the marriage; (4) the
resulting disparity in earning capacity between
the requesting spouse and the spouse benefited
thereby; and (5) the amount of property accumulated during the marriage.11 An award of
equitable restitution will not terminate upon
plaintiffs remarriage, and may be payable in
lump sum or periodically over time depending
on the circumstances of each case.11
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed
in part and reversed in part. The case is remanded to the trial court for the purpose of
taking any further evidence that may be necessary to determine the amount of equitable
restitution to be awarded to plaintiff and its
manner of payment and for entry of judgment
pursuant to this opinion. Costs against defendant.
Richard C. Davidson, Judge
I CONCUR:
Judith M. Billings, Judge
1. The decree of divorce utilizes the term
"deduction* and the United States Code utilizes
"exemption" when referring to the individual allowance subtracted from income when computing tax
owed.
2. The lower court also found that plaintiff expected
a 25^i reduction in her salary because of a voluntary transfer to a less stressful position within her
employment.
3. Section 78-45-7(2) lists the following factors to
be considered in awarding prospective support:
(a) the standard of living and situation of the
parties;
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties;
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) the need of the obligee;
(0 the age of the parlies;
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for the
support of others.
4. This Court notes, however, that a Task Force
established by the Judicial Council is presently investigating the propriety of adopting Uniform Child
Support Guidelines for Utah based upon current
economic data.
5. The award to age 21 was made by the trial court
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §15-2-1 (1986).
6. A review of plaintiffs expenses shows them to be
extremely low and based upon what she actually
spent rather than estimates of what she needed to
sustain herself and her children at a reasonable standard of living based upon the total family income.
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7. It is argued that estimating the value of a medical
degree is no more speculative than measuring
damages in a wrongful death case. However, in
wrongful death, the measurement begins at death
and is subject to no future variables introduced by
the decedent. Here, we must guess at the future
course of defendant's career. Will he continue to
practice in the same specialty in the same locale? A
future decision or happenstance could totally change
or even terminate the value of the medical degree.
Can defendant then return to court to change the
valuation and distribution based upon the more
certain circumstances? Could plaintiff prevent defendant from making decisions which could impact
the value of the degree?
8. We must wonder whether defendant could have
or would have entered and completed medical
school had plaintiff obtained a divorce earlier.
Defendant likely would have been obligated to pay
alimony and child support. He would probably not
have had the benefit of the family home and surely
would not have had the benefit of plaintiffs parttime work.
9. Traditional alimony forces the recipient to make
future choices with the understanding that such
choices may result in the loss of alimony. See Utah
Code Ann. §§30-3-5(5) and (6) (1987). No one
should be forced into making such choices, particularly when the other party, who enjoys his position
through the joint efforts of both parties, is under no
similar restrictions on behavior. We note what the
Oklahoma Supreme Court wrote in Hubbard v.
Hubbard. 603 P.2d 747 (Okl*. 1979), when responding to the argument that the wife's recovery from
her physician husband, whom she helped through
medical school, be limited to alimony for support
and maintenance. The per curiam decision reasoned
"To do so would force her to forego remarriage and
perhaps even be celibate for many years simply to
realize a return on her investments and sacrifices of
the past twelve years." Id. at 752 (footnote omitted).
10. We emphasize the specific nature of the facts
presented in this case and stress that equitable restitution would not be awarded in the more frequent
case where the marriage lasted for many years after
the professional degree had been granted. There,
sufficient assets would have been accumulated and
an appropriate distribution to the requesting spouse
would enable that spouse to share in the economic
benefits earned as a result of the degree.
11. Because this case establishes a new form of
spousal award, we hesitate to state that the enumerated factors in determining equitable restitution are
all inclusive as of the writing of this opinion. See
Biswcll v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80, 86 n.5 (Utah App.
1987).
12. For example, in following the Utah Supreme
Court's admonishment against unnecessarily tying a
couple together after divorce as stated in Gardner,
748 P.2d at 1079, defendant's lien on the family
home might be extinguished and the amount credited against the overall award of equitable restitution. We recognize that this would probably be only
a fraction of the total amount of equitable restitution awarded.
JACKSON, Judge (dissenting):
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could not dissuade my colleagues from breaking new ground with the invention of
'equitable restitution." The opinion manufactures a divorce remedy that is (1) outside our
statutory scheme;1 (2) without precedent in the
pronouncements of the Utah Supreme Court;
(3) not requested by the appellant;* (4) forced
on the trial courts for further development; (5)
not needed to do justice to the parties in this
case and may, in fact, work inequity.
EQUITABLE RESTITUTION OR SUPPORT
In Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237 (Utah
App. 1987), this court held that an advanced
degree is not marital property subject to division upon divorce, even where this achievement has been made possible through the
assistance of the other spouse. We have,
nonetheless, acknowledged that there may be
situations where equity demands an extraordinary award of nontcrminable rehabilitative or
reimbursement alimony in order to compensate a spouse who "endurefs] substantial financial sacrifices or defer[sJ her own education
to help* the other spouse in obtaining an
advanced degree. Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738
P.2d 238, 241 (Utah App. 1987). This might
occur where: (a) the parties mutually endeavor
to increase one spouse's earning capacity, but
at the time of trial the spouse who has benefitted from the parties' endeavors is merely on
the threshold of a substantial increase in earnings, Petersen, 737 P.2d at 242 n.4; or (b)
there is insufficient marital property from
which to make a compensatory award to the
contributing spouse. See Gardner v. Gardner,
748 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1988). In such
cases, the spouse who has made substantial
financial sacrifices and contributions to increase the earning capacity of the other spouse is
entitled to recompense for those contributions
that are beyond the duty of support normally
associated with marriage, less any benefits
received. See, e.g., Roberto v. Brown, 107
Wis.2d 17, 318 N.W.2d 358 (1982); Mahoney
v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527
(1982).
Decisions from other jurisdictions involving
compensation of the spouse who has contributed to the attainment of an advanced degree
have generally involved four factors:
[FJirst, they share the loss of the
husband's foregone earnings during
the period of investment; second,
the wife provides the financial
capital to enable her husband to
forego those earnings; third, she
may forego opportunities to further
the development of her own earning
capacity; fourth, and most significantly, they both expect to gain a
return on the full costs of the investment through continuation of the
marriage. Thus, the working spouse

I respectfully and loyally dissent.
Loyal to the majority, but not to their
opinion, I flag their decision as being at the
forefront of judicial activism. I regret that I
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predicates her sacrifice of income
and personal educational advancement on the expectation of future
returns to her from sharing in her
husband's enhanced earning capacity.
Krauskopf, Recompense
for Financing
Spouse's Education: Legal Protection for the
Marital Investor in Human Capital, 28 Kan.
L. Rev. 379, 380(1980).
The extraordinary award fashioned by the
majority in this case is inappropriate for
several reasons. First, Mrs. Martinez did not
provide the financial capital that enabled her
husband to attain his college and advanced
degree. Instead, Dr. Martinez provided the
bulk of the family's financial support, in
addition to paying for his education. This is
not the classic "working spouse/student
spouse" situation necessitating an extraordinary award. See, e.g., Hubbard v. Hubbard,
603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979); Haugan v.
Haugan, 117 Wis.2d 200, 206, 343 N.W.2d
796, 799-800 (1984); Roberto, 318 N.W.2d
358.
Second, no evidence was presented that
Mrs. Martinez deferred her own career or
education in order to advance the education of
her husband. Both parties had only high
school educations at the time of marriage.
Mrs. Martinez testified at trial that she wanted
to continue her own education someday but
had not yet begun doing so, even though her
employer would pay three-fourths of her
school costs and would allow her to continue
working.
While Mrs. Martinez raised the children and
performed the household responsibilities, Dr.
Martinez provided the family's primary financial support in the form of his inheritance
monies, funds from student loans.(which the
trial court required him to repay), and proceeds from his G.I. Bill. Mrs. Martinez worked
part-time during three of the seventeen years
of their marriage. Her nominal total earnings
of approximately $2,300 were applied to
family living expenses. During the marriage,
the family took modest vacations, purchased
two homes, furniture and furnishings, and two
automobiles. Equity simply does not demand
an extraordinary remedy in this case because
no extraordinary injustice is present.
Even if Mrs. Martinez had made substantial
financial contributions or educational sacrifices in order to further her husband's education and career, there are other reasons why
the creation of a new hybrid award of equitable restitution is not warranted in this case.
Unlike the hypothetical case contemplated by
this court in Petersen, 737 P.2d at 242 n.4, in
which the spouse with an advanced degree is
only on the threshold of reaping an enhanced
income at the time of the parties' divorce, Dr.
Martinez was already earning a gross annual
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income of $100,000. He is not merely at the
threshold of significant earnings; he is already
standing in the parlor. In addition, the parties
here accumulated real and personal property
from which a compensatory property award
could be made: $34,561 equity in a home;
three vehicles worth $3,995; an IRA account
valued at $2,000; stocks of unknown value;
and household furnishings valued at $6,500.
The presence of both substantial earnings and
accumulated property at the time of the
divorce provides an adequate basis for rendering an extraordinary remedy, if Mrs. Martinez is entitled to recompense.
On the facts presented in this case, there are
additional reasons why 1 believe the majority's
disposition of this appeal is misguided: (1)
equity can be achieved under current alimony
and property distribution statutes and case
law; (2) an award of equitable restitution
coupled with the majority's generous alimony
and child support awards is double-dipping;
and (3) an award of equitable restitution, in
effect, treats the professional education as
"property" subject to division upon dissolution
of a marriage.
First, in fashioning an award of alimony,
the trial court must consider the financial
condition and needs of the recipient spouse,3
the ability of that spouse to be selfsupporting, and the ability of the other spouse
to pay. Paffel v. Paffcl. 732 P.2d 96, 100-01
(Utah 1986); Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072,
1075 (Utah 1985).
Dr. and Mrs. Martinez were married for
approximately seventeen years. The trial court
found that Dr. Martinez incurs expenses associated with his employment of approximately
$7,000 per year, leaving approximately $93,000
annually or $7,750 per month. Mrs. Martinez
earned approximately $1,033 per month and
estimated that she required $2,050 per month
to meet the expenses for herself and the three
children. Under the temporary support order,
she had been receiving $1,100 per month in
child support. She sought additional monies to
make up the difference between her net earnings and expenses and to provide her with the
means to make major house repairs.~In-the
event that a professional degree was not
viewed as a marital asset, she sought an
alimony award not subject to termination
upon remarriage.
The trial court stated that it considered the
large disparity between the parties' respective
earning abilities and the fact that the wife's
resources were inadequate to meet her needs.
However, I agree with Mrs. Martinez that the
trial court failed to apply these factors correctly in that the award of $400 per month
alimony, nonterminable for three years and
continuing for a period of five years, is so low
as to constitute a clear and prejudicial abuse
of discretion. Mrs. Martinez earns $1,033
gross income per month. The alimony

UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

Martinez . Martinez

CODE«CO

Provo, Uuh
44
80 Utah >dv. Rep. 35
awarded by the trial court, plus her net future earning capacity. The factors and varmonthly earnings of $846, provides her with iables involved in the valuation of an enhaapproximately $1,246 with which to meet her nced earning capacity are as speculative as
monthly expenses, excluding sums awarded for those involved in an attempt to value an advchild support. In contrast, Dr. Martinez anced degree; such speculation can only lead
enjoys approximately $7,750 gross monthly to inequity.
income. Considering the disparate earning
Provision for Mrs. Martinez's needs is best
capacities, the trial court's alimony award was dealt with through a generous but fair distriinsufficient and inequitable in that it failed to bution of property and award of alimony,4 not
provide the parties with a comparable stan- through the creation of a distinctly new form
dard of living.
of cleverly disguised marital property for
Second, based on Dr. Martinez's earnings which there is no precedent.
at the time of trial, the majority has increased
CHILD SUPPORT
total child support from $900 to $1,800 and !
Both husband and wife have a duty to
increased the duration and amount of alimony
to a permanent award of $750 per month. An support their children. Utah Code Ann.
award of equitable restitution on top of the §§78-45-3, -4 (1987). "Child support
already generous awards of alimony and child awards should approximate actual need, and,
support fashioned by the majority is duplica- when possible, assure the children a standard
of living comparable to that which they would
tive and not necessary to achieve equity.
Finally, an advanced degree is the memori- have experienced if no divorce had occurred/
alization of an individual's "attainment of the Peterson v. Peterson, 748 P.2d 593, 596 (Utah
skill, qualification and educational backgr- App. 1988).
The trial court found that Dr. Martinez
ound which is the prerequisite of the enhanced
earning capacity." Wehrkamp v. Wehrkamp, earned approximately $7,750 gross income per
357 N.W.2d 264, 266 (S.D. 1984); cf. Pete- month. Dr. Martinez testified that his earnings
rsen, 737 P.2d at 240 (quoting In re Marriage were established under a two-year employof Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 ment contract, that he was in the 50^o tax
(1978)(en banc)). The value of an advanced bracket, and that he had no tax shelter. The
degree lies in the potential for increased ear- trial court also found that Mrs. Martinez
nings made possible by the degree and by earned approximately $1,033 gross income per
other factors and conditions of employment. month. Mrs. Martinez testified to net monthly
If the advanced degree itself does not fall earnings of $846 plus nominal royalties from
within the classification of marital "property" an oil well. She anticipated a reduction in her
subject to distribution upon divorce, then earnings as a result of her voluntary cutback
neither should an individual's enhanced in working hours. Mrs. Martinez calculated
earning capacity. Hodge v. Hodge, 337 Pa. monthly living expenses for herself and the
Super. Ct. 151, 486 A.2d 951 (1984); Wehr- three children at $2,050. This was the only
evidence of the dollar amount of the chilkamp, 357 N.W.2d at 266; Stern v.
dren's monthly need for support. The majoN.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975).
rity has elected to disregard that evidence
The majority declares that:
because they think the figure was too low.
The function of equitable restitution
Having rejected the only evidence of the chilis to enable a spouse to share the newly
dren's need, the majority makes its own indobtained
earning capacity of
ependent estimate.
a former spouse who has achieved
Using their own estimate of need and the
that capacity through the significant
parties' gross monthly incomes, the majority
efforts and sacrifices of the requehas awarded $600 per month per-child for a
sting spouse which were detrimental
, total of $1,800.$ Their action fails to account
to that spouse's development. It is
J for the effects on each party of: (I) tax rate
nothing more than an equitable
changes under the 1986 Tax Reform Act;* (2)
sharing of the rewards of both
their award of the tax exemptions for all the
parties' common efforts and expechildren to Mrs. Martinez; (3) the disposition
ctations.
of the home mortgage debt as discussed
By creating a divisible interest in Dr. Mar- below; (4) their increase of alimony from $400
tinez's enhanced earning capacity, this court to $750 per month; and (5) their equitable
has awarded a nonterminable property interest restitution award in an amount to be determin a medical degree which goes beyond the ined by the trial court.
compensation approved in Petersen. The
I would remand this case on the child
majority has not limited its award to Mrs. support issue for the taking of further evidM a r t i n e z ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n s toward her ence and a current determination of the chilhusband's medical education costs; it has dren's need and the ability of both parents to
taken the further step of providing financial pay child support, to be considered with the
recompense for lost expectations. I would other appropriate adjustments in the parties'
reject any compensation formula based on incomes and liabilities.

UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

Martinez v. Martinez
80 Utah A( '. Rep. 35
45
at the gross disparity of income. The home
HOME MORTGAGE
mortgage matter alone justifies a remand.
The parties stipulated at trial that their
jointly-acquired home had a current market
CONCLUSION
value of $63,000 and an equity of $34,561.
The majority has fixed the amount of
The stipulated figures reveal the existence of a alimony and child support to be paid. This
home mortgage obligation in the sum of action deprives the trial court, on remand, of
$28,439. However, neither the trial court nor any flexibility to adjust the debts, property,
counsel identified this sizeable debt in the alimony, and support awards and to fashion
distribution of debts and property. Nor do the an overall award package that harmonizes all
trial court's written Findings of Fact specify the variables. The trial court's discretion will
who must assume the $28,439 mortgage obli- be so restricted that an equitable outcome will
gation and make the payments. The record be impossible. This case should instead be
reveals that Mrs. Martinez had been making a remanded for retrial on the alimony, child
$309 monthly mortgage payment and the court support and property distribution issues.
stated that each party was to assume and disNorman H. Jackson, Judge
charge those debts that they have been paying.
Paragraph 19 of the written Findings of
Fact states that the "[pjlaintiff [Mrs. Martinez) 1. The majority acknowledges the existence ot our
divorce statutes in remanding the child support and
should be awarded the exclusive use and occ- alimony issues. The majority states, (a) "On
upancy of the parties' residence subject to a remand, the trial court shall enter its order for child
lien in favor of Defendant for the sum of support in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §30$17,528.00 ..." The Decree of Divorce reiter- 3-5.1 (1987)/ i.e., raise the total amount of child
ates this language and awards plaintiff support from $900 to $1,800 per month; (b) "(Wje
"exclusive use and occupancy," subject to a award permanent alimony in the sum of $750 per
lien in defendant's favor. The court's oral month subject to the provisions ot Utah Code Ann
ruling was: "(t]he Court will award to the the §30-3-5 (1987)," i.e., increase alimony from the
$400 awarded by the trial court. However, no
[sic] Plaintiff the home of the parties, subject statute is cited as the basis for equitable restitution
to a lien for defendant's share of the equity in Our divorce statutes and case law authorize onlv the
the amount of one-half of the net equity."
distribution o( property and an award ot support
The court's allocation of the parties' fina- for the benefit of the spouse and children Utah
7
ncial obligations includes no reference to Code Ann §§30-3-1 to 10 6(198' )
$28,439 of mortgage debt. Mrs. Martinez was 2. Mrs Martinez argued both at trial and on appeal
required to pay specified debts and obligations that a professional degree is a property interest
totalling $8,179.73. The $28,439 was not spe- subject to division upon divorce. Since equitable
cified and does not appear in the record. Dr. restitution was not a part of Utah lavs until this
Martinez was required to pay specified debts majority opinion was crafted, the trial was not
conducted and the evidence was not presented under
and obligations totalling $26,169.04. If Mrs. that theory.
Martinez must assume and pay the house 3 In determining the "need" of the recipient nonsmortgage, her post-divorce debt responsibi- tudent spouse, the trial court is not limited to conlity is $36,618.73, $10,449.69 more than his.
sidering only the low living expenses incurred during
Conclusion of Law C provides that, "[i]n the time that the other spouse studied to obtain an
order to make the distribution ... [of marital advanced degree. The Utah Supreme Couii recentlv
property) as equal as possible, Plaintiff should stated in Gardner, a :ase also involving an advanced
be awarded the real property ... subject to a degree, that alimony should "equalize the parties'
respective standards of living and maintain them at
lien in favor of Defendant for one-half of a level as close as possible to the standard of living
the present equity therein, that being for the enjoyed during the marriage " Gardner, 748 P 2d at
sum of $17,678." Although the stated objec- 1081; accord Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669, 671
tive is equality of distribution, the requirement (Utah App 1987), Petersen, 737 P 2d at 239. Olson
that Mrs. Martinez assume and pay the mor- v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566 (Utah 1985), Higley v
tgage would burden her by an additional Higley, 676 P 2d 37<>, 381 (Utah 1983) Although
$14,219.50 (1/2 of $28,439), despite the Gardner involved a marriage in which the parties
parties' widely disparate disposable income enjoyed a high standard of living for many years
prior to the divorce, the language of Gardner was
and the fact that Mrs. Martinez must support clearly
aimed at preventing the divorced spouse of a
herself and the children on less than $2,200 high income earner from suffering a major decline
per month. Since the court failed to specific- in standard of living following a divorce. This lanally identify the home mortgage, the court also guage should not be construed as prohibiting a trial
failed to include the amount of $28,439 in the court from making an award that raises the recipient
equity calculation. Thus Mrs. Martinez spouse's standard ot living from what it was dunng
became personally responsible to pay the the marriage where, as here, the student spouse
experiences a major increase in earnings just prior to
major debt of the parties.
The trial court's inclusion of the home the marriage's termination In other words, the
"need" of the recipient spouse in this situation is not
mortgage in Mrs. Martinez's debt burden as necessarily what he or she managed to live on
part of the property and debt distribution is during the lean school years
an abuse of discretion, even without looking
CODE • co
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4. Unlike the majority's award of equitable restitution, an alimony award can be modified, in appropriate circumstances, under the court's exercise of
continuing jurisdiction Utah Code Ann §30-35(3X1987) This is particularly important in the situation presented here, where Dr Martinez is
working under a contract of limited duration
5 The majority opinion interchanges the terms
"adjusted gross income" and "gross income" in
comparing the amount of child support awarded by
the trial court with an award calculated under guidelines from Colorado and Wisconsin, even though
the terms have markedly different meanings Although the majority disclaims reliance on the child
support guidelines from other jurisdictions, they do,
in fact, rely upon the potentially greater amounts
available in other jurisdictions in order to justify an
award of $600 per month per child
The problem with this analysis is that the guidelines adopted by other jurisdictions are irrelevant for
purposes of an award in Utah Child support guidelines utilize different approaches to allocate economic responsibility for children of divorced parents
depending upon varying pubbc policy See generally
Cassetty, "Emerging Issues in Child Support Policy
and Practice," in The Parental Child Support Obligation Research, Pracuce and Policy 3 (J Cassetty
ed 1983)
As the majority opinion demonstrates, the recommended amount of child support under other
jurisdictions' guidelines may radically differ because
of differences in the underlying policy goals adopted
by a given state The guidelines of some states, such
as Wisconsin, do not adjust for the income of the
custodial parent This is obviously inconsistent with
Utah's adoption of a public policy which holds both
parents responsible for the support of their children
For these reasons, whether the support guidelines in
other states would afford a higher level of support
should not be a factor in making an equitable award
in Utah
6 The Tax Reform Act of 1986 will have a significant impact on Dr Martinez's disposable income,
assuming ongoing gross income in the $100,000
range He testified at trial that he had to set aside
one-half of his income to pay taxes For 1988 and
later tax years, there are two basic tax rates for
individuals, 15ft and 28ft In addition, the law
effectively creates a third rate of 33ft on income
above certain levels Thus, portions of Dr Martinez's income will be taxed at 15ft, 28ft, and 33ft
rather than all at 50ft Moreover, Utah income tax
laws have changed in the interim Counsel in divorce
actions would be well advised to provide the trial
court with complete information regarding the tax
implications of the property distribution, alimony,
child support and dependency exemption arrangements being proposed The combined disposable
income available to the severed family can often be
increased by prudent tax planning dunng a divorce
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Gary V. PETERSEN, Plaintiff
and Appellant,

Traditional alimony analysis is appropriate and adequate method for making
adjustments between spouses, one of whom
has helped finance the other's advanced
education, where divorce does not take
place until several years after second
spouse has earned his/her degree.
5. Divorce «=>247

v.

Julie A. PETERSEN, Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 860007-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
May 18, 1987.
Parties' marriage was dissolved by the
Second District Court, Weber County, Calvin Gould, J., and husband appealed from
court's division of marital property. The
Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that: (1)
medical degree that husband earned during
marriage while wife was principal wage
earner did not constitute "property" subject to division in connection with parties'
divorce, but (2) award of $1,000 per month
to wife, to compensate her for her "share"
in husband's advanced degree, could be
sustained Dy recharacterizing it as provision for additional alimony.
Affirmed
rections.

and

remanded

with

Utah 237

4. Divorce <3=237

di-

"Rehabilitative" or "reimbursement"
alimony not terminable upon remarriage
may be appropriate, to compensate one
spouse for sacrifice of helping to finance
other spouse's advanced degree, where divorce takes place shortly after degree is
obtained, before first spouse has had
chance to enjoy comfortable life-style
which degree will permit.
6. Divorce <s=>240(2)
Award of $1,000 per month to doctor's
wife, to compensate wife for her "share" in
husbands medical degree, could be sustained bv recharacterizing not as nrnnt>n
settlement but as p r o v i s ion for additional
alimony, to extent such additional alimony
was warranted under circumstances.
7. Divorce e=>237

Generally, trial court is permitted considerable discretion in adjusting financial
and property interests of parties to divorce
action, and its determinations are entitled
to presumption of validity.

Criteria considered in determining reasonable award of support must include financial conditions and needs of spouse in
need of support, ability of that spouse to
produce sufficient income for his or her
own support, and ability of other spouse to
provide support.

2. Divorce <&=*252.3(1)

8. Divorce «=240(2)

1. Divorce <3=184(4)

Medical degree that husband earned
while wife was principal wage earner was
not "property" subject to division in connection with parties' divorce.
Sec publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
3. Divorce <*=>252.3(1)
Advanced degree is or confers intangible right which cannot properly be characterized as "property," subject to division
between spouses in connection with their
divorce; declining to follow Daniels v.
Daniels, 20 Ohio 0p.2d 458, 185 N.E.2d 773.

Alimony of $2,000 per month was not
unreasonable, where wife had substantially
financed husband's medical education subsequently became accustomed to comfortable life style that medical degree made
possible, and enjoyed much different earning potential than that of husband to
whom all of income-producing assets had
been awarded.

Paul M. Belnap, Strong & Hanni, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant
Pete N. Vlahos, Vlahos & Sharp, Ogden
for plaintiff and appellant
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Before ORME, JACKSON and
BENCH, JJ.
OPINION
ORME, Judge:
The appellant seeks a reversal or readjustment of the property division and alimony awarded to his former wife upon
their divorce. His challenge focuses on a
$120,000 property settlement given to his
ex-wife to reflect her interest in his medical
degree. We affirm the trial court's basic
disposition, but require amendment of the
decree insofar as the $120,000 award is
concerned.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The parties were married in September
1963 when they were both entering their
senior year of college. Both graduated
with Bachelor's degrees. Dr. Petersen continued his educatiun and obtained a Master's degree, while Mrs. Petersen worked
as an elementary school teacher to help
finance her husband's education. After receiving his Master's degree, Dr. Petersen
entered medical school. During medical
school, Dr. Petersen earned approximately
$1,000 per year in income. The couple also
took out a student loan and received some
money from Mrs. Petersen's parents.
While her husband was in medical school,
Mrs. Petersen worked one year on a full
time basis and three years part time.
When Dr. Petersen began his internship,
Mrs. Petersen stopped working to stay at
home with their child. During the next
fifteen years, Mrs. Petersen was not employed outside the home and her teaching
certification expired.
By the time of their divorce, the parties
had been married twenty years and had six
children under the age of 18. The decree
gave Mrs. Petersen custody of the six minor children, the family residence subject
to the first mortgage, most of the family
furniture, and two automobiles. She was
awarded $300 per month per child as child
support, $1,000 per month alimony, and the
cash property settlement of $120,000,
which Dr. Petersen was to pay in install-

ments of $1,000 per month without interest
Under the decree, Dr. Petersen received
his professional corporation, the total interest in his pension and profit sharing plan,
two condominiums, a boat, an undivided
one-seventh interest in a cabin near Bear
Lake, and other rental property. He also
was given the right to claim all six children
as dependents for income tax purposes.
The trial court explained the $120,000
cash settlement as follows:
The Court believes that this case is classic, in that defendant is entitled to a
property award reflecting an ownership
interest of the defendant in plaintiffs
medical degree. It is abundantly clear
that defendant helped plaintiff earn that
degree during their marriage, and that
plaintiffs ability to earn is based upon
that degree. Further, that following the
earning of the degree and the entry into
the medical practice, by mutual agreement, defendant undertook the raising
and nurturing of the children as her responsibility to the marital partnership,
while plaintiff practiced medicine. It is
difficult to find in the evidence presented
any system for the measurement of the
value of the degree, and the Court must
therefore deal with the case mostly upon
an alimony basis. To deal with the case
fully upon an alimony basis is not fair to
the defendant, inasmuch as any effort to
restructure her life by seeking to better
her employment opportunities or to remarry will operate against her alimony
rights. Defendant is therefore awarded
$1,000 per month permanent alimony and
a lump sum property award in respect to
the medical degree in the amount of
$120,000, payable in installments of
$1,000 per month from the date of the
decree.
On appeal, Dr. Petersen argues that the
division of marital property was inequitable, particularly the $120,000 property
settlement given to his wife. Dr. Petersen
argues that it was error to characterize
"his" medical degree as marital property
and require him to cash out Mrs. Peter-
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sen's interest therein over a 10-year pen
od
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
[1] Generally, the tnal court is permit
ted considerable discretion in adjusting the
financial and property interests of the par
ties to a divorce action, and its determinations are entitled to a presumption of validi
ty Eg, Burnham i Burnham, 716 P 2d
781, 782 (Utah 1986) And although appel
late courts may weigh the evidence and
substitute their judgment for that of the
tnal court in divorce actions, as the Supreme Court stated in Turner v Turner,
649 P 2d 6 (Utah 1982), "this court will not
do so lightly and merely because its judg
ment may differ from that of the trial
judge A trial court's apportionment of
property will not be disturbed unless it
works such a manifest injustice or inequitv
as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion
649 P 2d at 8
In the present case, the trial court appro
pnately attempted to equalize tne parties
respective standards of living See Olson
v Olson, 704 P2d 564, 566 (Utah 1985)
Dr Petersen was found capable of earning
$100,000 per year while Mrs Petersen s
ability to obtain recertification and secure a
teaching contract was found to be specula
bve at best Even if she succeeded, she
would earn only one-fourth to one fifth of
what Dr Petersen would earn annually
The trial court spoke of the difficulty of
measuring the value of Dr Petersen's degree The court chose to balance the inequalities between the parties partly with
the alimony award
However, the tnal
court did not want Mrs Petersen to lose all
of her entitlement upon remarriage, so the
trial court provided for an additional $120,
I. In Dogu v Dogu, 652 P2d 1308 (Utah 1982)
the Utah Supreme Court dealt with the valua
uon of a professional corporation In Dogu the
husband was awarded his protessional corpora
uon, and his wife was awarded property to
offset its value 652 P 2d at 1309 Although the
proper characterization of a medical degree as
in the present case, and the valuation of a professional medical corporation as in Dogu, may
involve related questions, the legal issues re
garding the two are distinct

000 as a property award, payable in $1,000
monthly installments Characterization of
these payments as a property award created the main issue for appeal
DEGREES AS PROPERTY
[2] The question of whether an ad
vanced degree is a property interest subject to division upon divorce is one of first
impression at the appellate level in Utah !
However, the majority of jurisdictions that
have considered the issue have held that
advanced degrees or professional licenses
are not property
Wtsner v Wxsner, 129
Ariz 333, 631 P 2d 115, 122 (Anz App 1981)
(husband's medical license and board certificate are not property subject to division,
but education is a factor to be considered in
arriving at equitable property division,
maintenance, and child support), In re
Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal App 3d 446,
152 Cal Rptr 668 677 (1979) (legal edu
cation not a property right), In re Mar
mage of Graham 194 Colo 429, 574 P 2d
75, 77 (1978) (MBA degree not marital
properU subject to division) In re Mar
nage oj Hortsman
263 N W 2d 885, 891
(Iowa 1978) (law degree is not a distnbuta
ble asset upon divorce future earnings
are), Olah v Olah, 135 Mich App 404, 354
N W 2d 359 361 (Mich App 1984) (medical
degree not properly or marital asset) Ma
honey i Mahoney 91 N J 488 453 A 2d
527, 536 (1982) (courts mav not make any
permanent distribution of the value of professional degrees and licenses, whether
based on estimated worth or cost), Ruben
v Ruben, 123 N H 358, 461 A 2d 733, 735
(1983) (graduate degree acquired by one
spouse dunng the marriage is not an asset
subject to division upon divorce), Muckler
oy v Muckleroy, 84 N M 14, 498 P 2d
1357, 1358 (1972) (medical license is not
In Tremayne v Tremayne, 116 Utah 483 211
P2d 452 (1949) the Supreme Court upheld the
trial court s property division and award of ah
mony to the wife referring to the wife s work
mg to help her husband through school the
fact that with the divorce the wife was de
pnved of the benefits of his increased earnings
and the discrepancy in their earning capacities
Tremayne does not address the issue of whether
an advanced degree or license is marital proper
ty
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community property), Hubbard v Hubbard, 603 P2d 747, 750-51 (Okl 1979)
(medical license not property but wife entitled to compensation for her investment)2
These cases and others are consistent
with our understanding of what "property"
island what an educational degree is
Property can be bought, sold, and devised
Bona fide degrees cannot be bought, they
are earned They cannot be sold, they are
personal to the named recipient Upon the
death of the named recipient, the certificate
commemorating award of the degree might
be passed along and treasured as a family
heirloom, but the recipient may not, on the
strength of that degree, practice law or
medicine In this case, the court awarded
the parties' home to Mrs Peterson But it
might have awarded the home to Dr Peter
sen or it might have ordered the home sold
and the net proceeds divided The court
had no such alternatives with the medical
degree preciselv because the degree is not
property Consideration of some of the
cases cited above and others supports our
fundamental conclusion and demonstrates
the range of related problems
In Muckleroy v Muckleroy, 84 N M 14,
498 P2d 1357 (1972), it had been argued
that the husband's education was the prod
uct of the joint labor and industry of both
parties, so that after their marriage it was
community property The New Mexico Supreme Court rejected this argument and
concluded
A medical license is only a permit issued
by the controlling authority of the State,
authorizing the individual licensee to engage in the practice of medicine The
medical license may be used and enjoyed
by the licensee as a means of earning a
livelihood, but it is not community property because it cannot be the subject of
joint ownership
84 N M at 15, 498 P 2d at 1358
The same issue arose as to an MBA
degree earned by the husband in In re
2. The question of whether an advanced degree
or professional license is marital property subject to division upon divorce has attracted con
siderable attention from legal scholars. For
one of the better reasoned discussions, see Note,

Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo 429, 574
P 2d 75 (1978) Again, the concept of an
advanced degree being property was reject
ed
An educational degree, such as an
M B A , is simply not encompassed even
by the broad views of the concept of
"property" It does not have an exchange value or any objective transfer
able value on an open market It is
personal to the holder It terminates on
death of the holder and is not inheritable
It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred,
conveyed, or pledged An advanced degree is a cumulative product of many
years of previous education, combined
with diligence and hard work It may
not be acquired by the mere expenditure
of money It is simply an intellectual
achievement that may potentially assist
in the future acquisition of property In
our Me" , 't has none of the attributes of
property in the usual sense of that term
194 Colo at 432, 574 P 2d at 77
The wife in Graham had worked full
time throughout the couple's six year mar
nage, and had contributed 70 percent of
the family income in addition to most of the
household work while her husband was ac
quiring his degree The trial court found
that the degree was jointly owned property
and had determined that the future earning
value of the M B A degree to Mr Graham
was $82,836 00 Mrs Graham was awarded $33,134 00 of that amount On appeal,
the state supreme court affirmed the reversal of the trial court by the court of appeals 574 P 2d at 76 The fact that the
decision left Mrs Graham with nothing to
show for her six years of labor prompted a
three judge dissent which strongly urged
that the husband's increased earning power
represented by the degree should be con
sidered marital property, where there was
no accumulated property and the spouse
Property Distribution in Domestic Relations Law
A Proposal for Excluding Educational Degrees
and Professional Licenses from the Marital Es
tate, 11 Hofstra LRev 1327 (1983)
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who subsidized the degree was ineligible
Plaintiff does not contend that his license
for maintenance 3 574 P 2d at 7&-79
is excluded from distribution because it
is separate property, rather, he claims
The equitable concerns addressed in the
that it is not property at all but repreGraham dissent are reflected in the few
sents a personal attainment in acquinng
cases that have found an advanced degree
knowledge He rests his argument on
or professional license to be mantal properdecisions in similar cases from other jurty
isdictions and on his view that a license
In Daniels v Daniels, 185 N E 2d 773
does
not satisfy common law concepts of
(Ohio 1961), the court held that the right to
property
Neither contention is controlpractice medicine was in the nature of a
ling
because
decisions in other States
franchise and constituted property which
rely pnncipally on their own statutes,
the trial court had a right to consider in
and the legislative history underlying
making an award of alimony In Daniels,
them, and because the New York Legisthe parties to the action were married while
lature deliberately went beyond traditionstudents at a university During the time
of their mamage the wife received her
al property concepts when it formulated
degree in business administration and the
the Equitable Distnbution Law
husband received a degree in medicine one 66 N Y 2d at 583, 489 N E 2d at 715, 498
vear later Each contributed toward his or
N Y S 2d at 746 New York's highest court
her own maintenance and education, the
acknowledged in O'Brien that then statute
balance in financial support for the family
creates a new species of property previous
coming from the wife s father, who contnb
ly unknown at common law or under pnor
uted sizable sums to the mamage At the
statutes
66 N Y 2d at 586, 489 N E 2d at
time of their divorce, neither party had
719
498
N
Y S 2d at 748 Cntical portions
much in the way of tangible assets The
court awarded $24 000 in lump sum alimo- of the New York Equitable Distnbution
ny, but did not actually divide the value of Law provide that in making an equitable
the medical degree 185 N E 2d at 776 distribution of mantal property, the court
shall consider the efforts one spouse made
Recenth, in 0 'Bnen v 0 Bnen, 66 to the other spouse's career or career poN Y 2d 576 489 N E 2d 712, 498 N Y S 2d tential and the difficulty of evaluating an
743 (1985) the New York Court of Appeals interest in a profession 66 N Y 2d at 584,
affirmed the trial courts holding that a 489 NE2d at 715-16, 498 N Y S 2d at
license to practice medicine acquired dunng 746-47 Thus, the analysis in O'Brien, al
the marriage is marital property subject to though illustrative of the equitable con
division In O'Brien, the wife was held
cerns for the working spouse who supports
entitled to a 40 percent interest in her
the other through an advanced degree, 66
husband's medical license The wife had
NY 2d at 585-88, 489 N E 2d at 716-18,
contributed approximately 76 percent of
498
N Y S 2d at 746-48, is limited in appli
the couples' total income while the husband
cation
because of the pivotal role of the
obtained his license The breakdown of the
unusual
and expansive distnbution statute
mamage occurred shortly after the hus
band completed his schooling, and the only enacted in New York
tangible asset existing after their nine-year
[3-5] We agree with the majonty opinmarriage was the husband's medical h ion in Graham that an advanced degree is
cense
or confers an intangible nght which, be
cause
of its character, cannot properly be
The New York court distinguished its
characterized as property subject to divianalysis in 0 'Bnen from that of other jur
isdictions which have found a license or sion between the spouses No special statadvanced degree not to be mantal proper ute, as in New York, permits us to treat
the degree as though it were property On
ty. As the O'Brien court explained
3- In Graham, the wife did not request alimony
because a Colorado statute Colo Rev Stat § 1410-114 (1973), restricted the courts power to

award maintenance to cases where the spouse
seeking it was unable to support himself or
herself 574 P 2d at 79
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the other hand, criteria for an award of
support in Utah are not so rigid as in
Colorado, preventing the harsh result of
Graham $ftf thisfctate,traditional alimony
analysis is the appropriate and adequate
method for making adjustments between
the parties in cases of this type.4

ration We find the basic property division
equitable
[71 As for the cash settlement payable
in monthly installments of $1,000, it is
properly affirmed as alimony, making Mrs
Petersen's entire alimony award $2,000 per
month. Criteria considered in determining
a reasonable award of support must include the financial conditions and needs of
the spouse in need of support, the ability of
that spouse to produce sufficient income
for his or her own support, and the ability
of the other spouse to provide support
Jones v Jones, 700 P 2d 1072, 1075 (Utah
1985)

AWARD IN THIS CASE
[6] As indicated, the trial court was in
error when it awarded Mrs Petersen the
$120,000 cash settlement to reflect her
share of the value of her husband's medical
degree Nonetheless, the court's basic disposition was fair and can be sustained if
the $1,000 monthly payments which Dr
Petersen was to make in satisfaction of
[8] In this case, then, the first factor to
that obligation are recharacterized as addi
be considered is the financial condition and
tional alimony, a result which is readily needs of Mrs Petersen For over ten
supported by the trial court's findings
years, Mrs Petersen and her family enIn reviewing the court's f.nd n gs, «VP find joyed a very comfortable lifestyle She
ample evidence to affirm the property divi now must make mortgage payments on tne
sion aside from the $120,000 cash settle home and pay for the ordinary expenses of
ment As the Supreme Court stated in food, clothing and transportation Other
Fletcher v Fletcher, 615 P 2d 1218 (Utah than the one-half interest in the investment
1980), "[tjhere is no fixed formula upon corporation, Mrs Petersen was awarded
which to determine a division of properties, none of the income-producing assets She
it is a prerogative of the court to make has no outside income
whatever disposition of property as it
The second factor to be considered is
deems fair, equitable, and necessary for Mrs Petersen's ability to produce a suffithe protection and welfare of the parties " cient income for herself Although Mrs
615 P 2d at 1222 Although Dr Petersen Petersen is a college graduate with a Bach
was awarded a smaller percentage of the elor's degree and is trained as a school
marital assets, he received all but one of teacher, she is not currently certified She
the income producing assets his profes- would require additional training to become
sional corporation, his pension and profit certified and, even if certified, her ability to
sharing plan, two condominiums, and other produce income would be one-fourth to onebusiness interests The parties were to fifth of what Dr Petersen's income has
share evenly in a $10,000 investment corpo- provided the family The trial court found
4

In cases like the instant one, life patterns have
largely been set the earning potential of both
parties can be predicted with some reliability,
and the contributions and sacrifices of the one
spouse in enabling the other to attain a degree
have been compensated by many years of the
comfortable lifestyle which the degree permit
ted Traditional alimony analysis works nicely
to assure equity in such cases
In another kind of recurring case, typified by
Graham, where divorce occurs shortly after the
degree is obtained, traditional alimony analysis
would often work hardship because, while both
spouses have modest incomes at the time of
divorce the one is on the threshhold of a signifi
cant increase in earnings. Moreover, the

spouse who sacrificed so the other could attain
a degree is precluded from enjoying the antici
pated dividends the degree will ordinarily provide Nonetheless, such a spouse is typically
not remote in time from his or her previous
education and is otherwise better able to adjust
and to acquire comparable skills, given the opportunity and the funding In such cases, alimony analysis must become more creative to
achieve fairness, and an award of "rehabilitative" or "reimbursement" alimony, not terminable upon remarriage, may be appropriate. See,
e.g, Haugan v Haugan, 117 Wis 2d 200 343
N W 2 d 796 (1984), Mahoney v Mahoney, 91
N J 488. 453 A 2d 527 (1982)
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that the chance of her being able to secure
a teaching contract was "speculative"
During most of the marriage, Mrs Peter
sen was not employed outside the home
She stopped working, primarily at the urging of her husband, and devoted her time
to raising their six children It is unreasonable to assume that she will be able
immediately to enter the job market and
support herself in the style in which she
had been living before the divorce
See
Jones v Jones, 700 P 2d 1072, 1075 (Utah
1985).

ty to provide support is the result of an
advanced degree or professional license is
irrelevant to the analysis The key is the
spouse's ability
In Savage v Savage, 658 P 2d 1201 (Utah
1983), the Supreme Court explained
Where a marriage is of long duration and
the earning capacity of one spouse great
ly exceeds that of the other, as here, it is
appropnate to order alimony and child
support at a level which will insure that
the supported spouse and children may
maintain a standard of living not unduly
disproportionate to that which they
would have enjoyed had the marriage
continued

The final factor to be considered is the
ability of Dr Petersen to provide support
This is the proper realm in which to consid
er advanced degrees or professional hcens
es An advanced degree is ordinarily an
indicator of potential future earnings In
addition, the attainment of a degree by one
spouse often results in a disparity of income that 23 likely tc last for n g ^ a t t^me,
particularly in cases like the present one
Dr Petersen has a history of earning more
than $100,000 a year and Mrs Petersen has
not worked for the past fifteen But it is
the discrepancy in their earning power
which is the basis for alimony, not the
discrepancy in their educations There is
no logical reason, for example, for treating
differently a self-trained artist without for
mal education who earns and will earn
$100,000 a year and a doctor with a medical
degree who earns and will earn $100,000 a
year. Other things being equal, if such an
artist divorces his or her spouse, he or she
should pay alimony comparable to that paid
by such a doctor Whether a spouse's abih-

Accordingly, this case is remanded to
District Court to amend the decree to provide that Mrs Petersen receive $2,000 per
month alimony and, correspondingly, to delete the $120,000 cash award The decree

5. It is clear the court viewed the payments to
Mrs, Petersen, both those it specifically called
alimony and the additional $1,000 monthly pay
ments, as appropnate for her support It uti
hzed the "property" label in characterizing some
of the monthly total as a means to preclude
terminauon of the payments to Mrs Petersen
upon her remarriage Although the court provided that the $1,000 per month payments not
called alimony would terminate in ten years,
nothing in the court's findings establishes any
particular significance to that point in time
We accordingly see no basis, now that the entire
monthly payment is properly characterized as
alimony, to require that half of the $2,000
monthly total automatically arid arbitrarily tcr
minate at the end of ten years Cf Olson v
Olson, 704 P2d 564, 567 (Utah 1985) (court

modified divorce decree to delete provision that
alimony would terminate after two years where
monthly amount was reasonable but two-year
limit was not) Of course, it would be proper
for the district court to readjust the amount of
alimony awarded to Mrs Petersen if at any
point in time there develops a material change
of circumstances, such as Mrs Petersen seeming gainful employment or if Dr Petersen s sala
ry drops dramatically through no fault of his
own See, eg , Naylor v Naylor, 700 P 2d 707,
710 (Utah 1985), Haslam v Haslam, 657 P 2d
757, 758 (Utah 1982) The district court retains
continuing jurisdiction in divorce actions to
amend alimony
Utah Code Ann § 30-3-5
(1986) In addition the alimony awarded to
Mrs Petersen automatically terminates under
certain circumstances Id

658 P 2d at 1205 See Jeppson v Jeppson,
684 P2d 69 <Utah 1984)
In Saiage, the parties had enjoyed a high
standard of living during the marriage and
the court upheld an award of $2,000 per
month alimonv and child support ot $500
per month per child 658 P 2d at 1205 In
Yelderman v Yelderman, 669 P 2d 406
(Utah 1983), the Supreme Court upheld an
alimony award of $2,500 per month as not
excessive 669 P 2d at 409 We agree that
$2,000 per month alimony to Mrs Petersen
is sufficient to help her maintain a stan
dard of living not unduly disproportionate
to that which she would have enjoyed if the
marriage had continued 5
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is otherwise affirmed. Each party shall
bear his or her own costs of appeal.
BENCH and JACKSON, JJ. f concur.
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Dawn W. HORNE, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
W. Reid HORNE, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 860060-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
May 18, 1987.

The 3rd District Court, Salt Lake
County, Kenneth Rigtrup, J., entered nunc
pro tunc order distributing property incident to previously granted divorce. Exhusband appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Billings, J., held that: (1) statute committing broad discretion to trial courts in
granting nunc pro tunc orders in domestic
relations matters was not limited in scope
to cases involving marital status of the
parties; (2) statute eliminated the commonlaw requirement of previously made final
order; and (3) good cause did not exist for
entry of the order nunc pro tunc.
Reversed and remanded.

1. Courts <*^114
The court has the power to act nunc
pro tunc—to do act upon one date and
make it effective as of prior date; the
common-law power of nunc pro tunc allows
the court to correct errors or supply omissions to permit the record to accurately
reflect that which in fact took place. U.C.
A.1953, 3(Ma-l.
2. Statutes «=»189
In construing legislative enactments,
the reviewing court assumes that each

term in the statute was used advisedly, and
thus, interprets and applies the statute according to its literal wording unless it is
unreasonably confused or inoperable.
3. Divorce <3=>254(1)
Statute committing broad discretion to
trial courts in granting nunc pro tunc orders in domestic relations was not limited
in scope to cases involving marital status of
the parties, but could also apply to property division problems; by its wording, the
statute applies to any and all matters relating to divorce proceedings. U.C.A.1953,
3(Ma-l.
4. Statutes «=>222, 239
Statutes are not to be construed as
effecting any change in the common law
beyond that which is clearly indicated;
however, where statute is in derogation of
the common law, and is also remedial in
nature, the remedial application should be
construed so as to give effect to its purpose.
5. Divorce <£=>162
Statute committing broad discretion to
trial courts in granting nunc pro tunc orders in domestic relations matters eliminated the common-law nunc pro tunc requirement of previously made final order; literal
reading of statute indicated legislative intent to change standard for entry of nunc
pro tunc orders in domestic proceedings
from requiring previously made final order
as delineated by common law to requiring
finding of "good cause," and legislative
history indicated that statute was remedial
in nature; Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298
(Utah), superseded by statute. U.C.A.1953,
3(Ma-l.
6. Divorce «=254(1)
"Good cause" did not exist to enter
nunc pro tunc order distributing property
incident to previously granted divorce;
agreement between parties expressly stated that property was to be transferred to
equalize the marital assets in order to insure that the transfer of property would
not be taxable event, and in entering order
prior to effective date of the Tax Reform
Act of 1984 and without the essential and
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ry intent is clearly revealed in the words he
wrote Since every required statutory ele
ment was expressed in his handwriting, no
sound purpose or policy was served by
invalidating Fitzgerald's holographic will
See Estate of Black, 30 Cal 3d 880, 889, 641
P 2d 754, 759, 181 Cal Rptr 222, 227 (1982)
The will with two dates is facially ambiguous about whether it was executed before
or on the same date as the single-dated
will However, the terms of the twice-dat
ed will do not conflict with the other will's
terms These consistent provisions must
be considered valid
Utah Code Ann
§ 75-2-503 (1978)
The holographic wills should have been
admitted to probate The order of the trial
court appointing Kenneth Fitzgerald as the
personal representative of decedent is va
cated, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this decision No
costs are awarded
BILLINGS and GARFF, JJ , concur

Catherine RAYBURN, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Robert L RAYBURN, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 860022-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah

rary alimony, and (2) award to wife of
one-half interest in husband's retirement
fund was not abuse of discretion
Affirmed as modified
1. Divorce «=>237. 252.3(1)
Advanced degree or professional h
cense is not marital property subject to
division upon divorce, but an advanced degree often accompanies disparity in earning
potential that is appropriately considered
as factor in alimony analysis
2. Divorce <S=>247, 252.3(1)
Cash settlement of $45,000, payable in
monthly installments of $750, could not be
sustained as property settlement, in that
value represented compensation for hus
band's professional degree but payments
could be properly affirmed as temporary
alimony, given wife's needs and husband s
ability to provide support
3 Divorce <s=>247
Award to wife of one half irtere^t in
present value of husband's retirement
fund, payable over five years with interest
was not abuse of discretion in that fund
was asset accumulated during marriage
and especially where court permitted pav
ments to be treated as "alimony for tax
purposes

Gaylen S Young, Jr , Salt Lake City for
defendant and appellant
B L Dart, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff
and respondent
Before ORME, BENCH and
JACKSON, JJ

May 29, 1987
OPINION
Action was brought for divorce The
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake
County, Dean E Conder, J , entered di
vorce decree, and husband appealed The
Court of Appeals, Orme, J , held that (1)
installment payments to account for hus
band's medical degree could not be sus
tamed as property settlement, but pay
ments could be properly affirmed as tempo-

ORME, Judge
In this divorce action, defendant Robert
L Rayburn appeals the valuation and dis
tnbution of a retirement plan and an award
of a $45,000 property settlement to offset
his medical degree We affirm the trial
court's basic disposition, but require
amendment of the decree insofar as the
$45,000 award is concen ec

RAYBURN v. RAYBURN

Utah

239

Cite M 738 PJ26 238 (UtahApp. 1987)

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Catherine Rayburn and Dr.
Rayburn were married in Florida on June
20, 1972. Earlier that same day, Dr. Rayburn had obtained his medical degree from
the University of Florida. At the time,
Mrs. Rayburn had a masters degree in
jgology and was employed as a research
associate at the University of Florida. The
couple moved to Houston, Texas where Dr.
Raybum completed a one year internship
at Baylor University. Dr. Rayburn earned
$8,000 to $9,000 during the internship.
Mrs. Raybum also worked during that
year, earning approximately $7,200. The
couple returned to Florida where Dr. Raybum completed a three-year residency,
earning approximately $11,000 to $13,500
per year. Mrs. Rayburn worked for a
short time in Florida, but upon the birth of
their first child, she stopped working fulltime and worked only occasionally, and on
a part-time basis, throughout the rest of
the marriage.
After the residency, the family moved to
San Antonio, where Dr. Rayburn completed
two years of military service. During the
five-year period of the internship, the residency, and his military service, Dr. Rayturn acted as the primary financial provider for the family. Mrs. Rayburn stayed at
Jjome, for the most part, to raise their
Tentual three children.
After military service, the family moved
)vSalt Lake City where Dr. Rayburn joined
tte staff of the Primary Children's Medical
Center as a pediatric-anesthesiologist. In
October 1982, Mrs. Rayburn filed for a
divorce.
Ifrrial was held on July 18 and 19, 1983.
At the time of trial, Dr. Rayburn was earnjBg approximately $125,000 a year. After
e two day trial, the court issued a memoidum decision. In the decision, the court
rmined to award custody of the three
or children, ages 9, 5, and 2, to Mrs.
iyburn and to order Dr. Rayburn to pay
id support in the amount of $400 per
id per month. Apparently overlooking
^J exact sequence of events on the RaygUrns' wedding day, the court found the
J&sband's medical degree to be a marital

asset and ordered Dr. Rayburn to pay Mrs.
Rayburn $45,000, payable at $750 a month,
as her share of the asset and to "maintain
her lifestyle for a period of adjustment."
The decision would have awarded Dr. Rayburn all of his retirement fund.
About two weeks later, the court issued
a supplemental decision in which the court
altered its earlier decision on the retirement plan. The court, "in order to make a
more equitable division of property/* ordered Dr. Rayburn to pay one-half the net
present value of the retirement plan, $56,850, to Mrs. Rayburn in five annual installments of $11,370 plus interest. The court
entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and a decree on September 15, 1983.
The decree expressly awarded no alimony
and set December 15, 1983. as the effective
date of the divorce.
Dr. Rayburn promptly filed a motion for
relief from judgment or for a new trial.
Dr. Rayburn claimed the trial court failed
to consider the drastic tax consequences of
placing a present value on the retirement
plan and awarding half of that to his wife.
The court took Dr. Rayburn's motion under
advisement. On December 9, 1983, the
court issued another memorandum decision. This decision provided for amendment of the decree in such terms as would
permit the five retirement plan payments
to be treated as alimony for tax purposes.
The court entered a second set of findings,
conclusions, and decree on February 28,
1984. The second decree again awarded no
alimony as such, made the embellishment
for tax purposes, and set February 28 as
the effective date of the divorce. Dr. Rayburn retained new counsel, who filed a
motion for relief from the new judgment or
a new trial. The court denied the motion
and Dr. Rayburn appealed.
On appeal, Dr. Rayburn claims the court
erroneously placed a high value on the
retirement plan without considering the tax
consequences. Dr. Rayburn also claims
the court erred in finding the medical degree to be a marital asset and placing a
value on it without any supporting evidence.
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RECORD ON APPEAL
divorce Petersen v Petersen, 737 P 2d
Dr Rayburn ordered a transcript on ap- 237 (Utah App 1987) However, an adpeal of only 30 pages, representing a tiny vanced degree often accompanies a disparifraction of the testimony offered at trial ty in earning potential that is appropnately
Under Rule ll(eX2) of the Rules of the considered as a factor in alimony analysis
Utah Court of Appeals and the predecessor See id., 243 We reaffirm our holding m
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, "If the Petersen and analyze the instant appeal
appellant intends to urge on appeal that a "under the same analysis employed in that
finding or conclusion is unsupported by or case.
is contrary to the evidence, the appellant
shall include in the record a transcript of
[2] The cash settlement of $45,000 pay
all evidence relevant to such finding or able in monthly installments of $750 cannot
conclusion " Since the transcript provided be sustained under Petersen as a property
by the appellant is insufficient to allow a settlement, but payments of $750 per
review of the evidence to determine the month for a five-year period are properly
propnetv of the findings, this court accepts
affirmed as alimony 4 Criteria considered
the trial court's Findings of Fact as true !
in determining a reasonable award of supand only evaluates the legal correctness of
port
must include the financial conditions
the two disputed dispositions2 As indi
and needs of the spouse in need of support
cated, the disputes concern the $45 000
*he ability of that spudbe to produce buffi
property settlement reflecting Mrs Rav
dent
income for his or her own support,
bum's "share" of her husband's medical
and
the
ability of the other spouse to prodegree and the payments for Mrs Ray
vide
support
Jones i Jones, 700 P 2d
burn's one half interest in the present val
3
1072
1075
(Utah
1985) See Paffel v Paf
ue of the doctor's retirement plan
fel 732 P 2d 96, 100-101 (Utah 1986) (fail
ure to consider these three factors consti
THE MEDICAL DEGREE
tutes an abuse of discretion) AJ1 hough
[1] Recently this court held that an ad
vanced degree or professional license is not characterizing the monthly payments as a
marital propertv subject to division upon property settlement, the trial court ex
1

See Sawyers v Sawyers 558 P2d 607 608
(Utah 1976) ("Appellate review of factual mat
tcrs can be meaningful orderly and intelligent
only in juxtaposition to a record by v*hich lower
courts ruling and decisions on disputes can be
measured ") In Sawyers, the Supreme Court
presumed the findings of the trial court to have
been supported by admissible competent sub
stantial evidence Id. See Mitchell v Mitchell
527 P2d 1359. 1360-61 (Utah 1974)

2. At oral argument Dr Rayburn advised he did
not really intend to question the findings in
view of the evidence only the propriety of the
disposition in view of the findings
3

On appeal, Dr Rayburn also argues that the
trial court erred in filing two separate Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and two sepa
rate decrees with different effective dales In
this regard he relics heavily on the failure of the
second batch of documents to employ the term
amended,** contending confusion will result
about which decree controls The second set of
findings, conclusions, and decree was of course
prompted by Dr Rayburn s motion for relief
from judgment Although not expressly labeled
as "amended the second set of findings con

elusions and decree clearly supercedes lhe first
set and are the direct subject of this appeal
4

The trial court quite clearly viewed those pay
ments as necessary for support but utilized the
property settlement label as a means to preclude
their termination should Mrs Rayburn remar
ry While it is true that with alimony the re
ceivmg spouse may lose some of his or her
award through certain changed circumstances
like remarriage Utah Code Ann § 30-3-5
(1986) it is noted that with installments on a
property award the receiving spouse might lose
some of the award if the paying spouse obtained
a discharge in bankruptcy By contrast an ah
mony obligation would survive bankruptcy H
U S C A § 523(a)(5) (West Supp 1987) Charac
tenzation of required future payment, as in
satisfaction of a marital property disposition
rather than as alimony is not always in ihe best
interest of the receiving spouse Cf Beckmann
v Beckmann 685 P 2d 1045 1050 (Utah 1984)
(The fact that an instrument is labeled property
settlement agreement docs not necessarily de
termine whether debt is dischargeable Court
will look at underlying nature of the debt m
eluding whether spouse would be imdequately
supported without the property settlement )
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njessly found factors that readily meet the
cntena listed in Jones
As for Mrs Rayburn s need for support
gnd her ability to produce sufficient in
come, the trial court found that Mrs Rav
burn was presently unemployed but that
she had been employed and was well-edu
cated, having acquired bachelor's and mas
tar's degrees However, with minor chil
dren residing at home and not yet in school,
Mrs Rayburn was reluctant to return lm
mediately to the full time workforce In
addition, the court accepted Mrs Ray burn's
testimony that in order to bring her employment skills to a satisfactory level, she
needed to return to school and obtain fur
ther education "to complement her current
education " 5 As for Dr Rayburn's ability
to provide support the trial court found
that Dr Rayburn was well educated hav
ing obtained an M D degree and that he
had a successful practice as a pediatric an
esthesiologist, earning a projected $125 000
for 1983
In its first memorandum decision the
trial court characterized the monthlv pa\
ments for Mrs Rayburn as necessar) to
maintain her life style for a period of ad
justment" The 5-year period correspond
ed to the amount of time it would take for
Mrs Raybuni to complete her idditional
education on a part time basis and until the
parties' youngest child was in school all
day*
We acknowledge that there will be situa
tons where an award of non terminable
rehabilitative or reimbursement alimony
*<Wlkl be appropriate See Petersen v Pet
«pen, 737 P 2d at 242 n 4 However, this
It not such a case Dr Rayburn acquired
**ijThis additional education was apparently in
* we field of computer science No doubt com
1 P'tfenzation has mushroomed in importance in
x * ^ ° 8 y . as in nearly every area of scientific
5^ € a d c a v °r. during the decade Mrs Rayburn was
^ttemployed Computer literacy would greatly
^jjjjance Mrs Rayburn s ability to obtain suit
f ^ r employment
k ™J

rational basis for limiting the payments
five-year period of adjustment distinguishes
, c a s c "Om Petersen where we declined to
't a ten year cap on alimony otherwise
where there was no articulated basis for
tlcally diminishing the award upon the

his medical degree before the parties were
J
AhL
married
Although
worked
" - L wMrs
"~ nRavburn
~ L
' J
periodically during the marriage she did
«ot endure substantial financial sacrifices'
or defer her own education to help him
obtain the degree In addition Mrs Ra>
burn shared the financial rewards permit
ted by her husband s advanced degree for
several years Those rewards also resulted
in the accumulation of considerable real
and personal propertv during their marriage, which was equitably divided upon
their divorce The awird of temporary all
mony, at $750 per month for a maximum of
five years" adequately meets Mrs Ray
burn's support needs and is readil) sustain
able under the criteria outlined in Jones
THE RETIREMENT PLAN
[3] Dr Ravburn s retirement fund was
one of the valuable assets accumulated
during the marriage and w*s of course
subject to equitable division upon divorce
Wooduard i Wooduard 656 P 2d 431 433
(litan 19o2; Sti zrigitrt t Enyttrt 576
P2d 1274 1276 (liuh 197b) We accept
the trial court s finding that the retirement
funds present value was $113 700 In its
second memorandum decision the trial
court explained that it had considered sev
tral wa\s to distribute the wifes share of
the retirement fund ind found fixing a sum
equal to one half of the prtstnt value md
distributing that to Mrs Ravburn as a cash
award to be the most equitable By requir
ing Mrs Rayburn s share in the retirement
fund to be cashed out following divorce,
the court avoided leaving the parties in a
financial entanglement that would contin
ue for approximately twentv or thirty
years and would probably result in further
elapse of ten years See Petersen v Petersen
111 P 2d at 243 n 5 See also Olson v Olson
704 P2d 564 567 (Utih 1985)
7

The alimony obligation could terminate carli
cr under certain circumstances
Utah Code
Ann § 30-3-5 (1986) In addition the district
court has continuing jurisdiction to change
the alimony award as is reasonable and neces
sary id (3) provided there develops a substan
tial change in the ptitics circumstances See
eg Naylor v Mavlor 700 P 2d 707 710 (Utah
1985)
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court hearings and cause future animosity
between the parties "
However, the court went on to explain
that "to require the defendant to pay the
full sum at one time would have been an
extra burden " By allowing Dr Rayburn
to make five annual payments, the court
left him the option of paying his obligation
out of current income or on some other
basis, rather than having to liquidate the
fund or sell other assets The court additionally softened the impact by ultimately
allowing the payments to be characterized
in such terms as would permit them to be
treated as 'alimony" for tax purposes 8
There is admittedly some potential for
confusion because of the measures taken
by the trial court to massage the tax treat
ment of the payments to Mrs Rayburn
However, these measures were the trial
court's response to Dr Rayburn s very
own argument that the payments worked a
financial hardship on him The trial court
allowed the payments to be considered 'ah
mony" for tax purposes in order to give Dr
Rayburn the tax break of the alimony de
duction while at the same time permitting
Mrs Rayburn to be cashed out within a
few years On appellate review, the trial
court's apportionment of property will not
be disturbed unless it works such a mam
fest injustice or inequity as to indicate a
clear abuse of discretion Eg, Turner v
Turner, 649 P 2d 6, 8 (Utah 1982) We
find no abuse of discretion in the court's
awarding Mrs Rayburn a one-half interest
in the retirement fund, payable over five
years with interest On the contrary, and
especially with the refinements which were
made to address Dr Raybum's concerns
about taxes, the trial court's approach was
clearly fair and equitable
Accordingly, this case is remanded to the
district court to amend the decree to provide that Mrs Rayburn receive $750 per
month alimony for five years and, corre
8

The trial court did not stop here in tailoring
the provision to make it as painless to Dr Ray
burn as possible under the circumstances The
court stated in its Conclusions of Law "In the
event that the payments under this paragraph
do not qualify as alimony for tax purposes, this
would constitute a change of circumstances en

spondmgly, to delete the $45,000 cash
award The decree is otherwise affirmed
Each party shall bear his or her own costs
of appeal
BENCH and JACKSON, JJ , concur

O I KDNUM8CR SYSTEM

SCIENTIFIC ACADEMY OF HAIR DESIGN, INC., a Utah corporation, dba
Mediterranean Hair Academy, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v
Robert 0 BOWEN, in his official capacity as director of the Division of Registration within the Department of Business Regulation, a Department of the
Government of the State of Utah, Defendant and Respondent
No 86003S-CA
Court of Appeals of Utah
June 8, 1987
Administrative suspension of license to
operate a cosmetology/barbenng school
was affirmed by order of the District
Court, Third Judicial District, Salt Lake
County, James S Sawaya, J , and school
appealed The Court of Appeals, Billings,
J , held that (1) the Court of Appeals had
jurisdiction to hear the appeal, but (2) the
findings in support of the suspension were
not contrary to a clear preponderance of
the evidence, even assuming such standard
rather than the "arbitrary and capricious
standard was applicable
Affirmed
titling the defendant to come back before the
Court and obtain a modification reducing th>s
payment to the extent of the income tax uhicn
he is required to pay because of an inability to
take a deduction of these payments as alimony
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a somewhat similar instruction was harmless error. Furthermore, the property stolen was not fungible property which defendant might have legitimately possessed.
Rather, the checks were identified as property belonging to others were shown to
have been forged and would not legitimately have been in his possession under any
circumstances.
Affirmed.
HALL, CJ., concurs.

Betty M. GARDNER, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
William James GARDNER, Defendant
and Respondent
No. 19246.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan 4, 1988.

DURHAM, Justice (concurring
separately):
I concur in the majority opinion, but
write separately to emphasize the obligation of defense counsel to notify judges
who have ruled on pretrial suppression issues that defendants' objections to challengea evidence are reserved and not with
drawn, in us alerting those judges to the
possibility that trial evidence may affect
the validity of earlier rulings I agree that
in this ca^e there was an extensive hearing
on defendant's motion to suppress, and it is
quite clear from the record that defense
counsel did not intend to waive any related
evidentiary objections at trial In fact, sev
eral ambiguous references during trial to a
"prior motion" may have referred to de
fendant's pretrial motion to suppress It is
important, however, that trial judges be
given the opportunity to review pretrial
suppression rulings when and if there is
any likelihood that they were erroneous
When the pretrial judge is also the trial
judge, unlike the circumstance in Statt v
Lesley, 672 P 2d 79, 82 (Utah 1983), this is
easily accomplished by indicating on the
record, either at the end of the pretrial
hearing or at the trial outside the presence
of the jury, that there is a continuing objec
tion to the evidence challenged in the mo
tion to suppress
HOWE, and ZIMMERMAN JJ ,
concur in the concurring opinion of
DURHAM, J

Divorce decree was entered by the Second District Court, Weber County, Ronald
0 Hyde, J , and wife appealed The Supreme Court, Stewart, Associate CJ., held
that (1) trial court was required to value
husband's retirement account, (2) w f p w ^
entitled to findings :r. support of denial of
her request for portion of husband's medical assets, (3) regardless of whether evaluation and distribution of a professional degree or professional practice is ever appropriate, it was inappropriate in the present
case where marriage *a> of long duration
and present earnings and business assets
provided a more accurate measure of the
true worth of wife's investment in husband's degree, and (4) alimony auard was
insufficient and inequitable
Reversed and remanded
Howe, J , filed opinion concurring and
du>senting.

1. Divorce e=286<3)
Though the Supreme Court may modif\ decisions of trial tourt trial court's apportionment of marital properU vull not be
disturbed unless it is clearly unjust or a
clear abuse of discretion
2. Divorce <£=252 3<l)
Marital property includes pension fund
or insurance but dividing retirement or
pension funds is not necessanlv consistent
with principles of equitable distribution in
all cases, and providing for pavments when

GARDNER v. GARDNER
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Cheat 744 ?24 1076 (Vtmh 198*)

payout begins should be employed only in
rare instances.

would qualify for social security payments
only as an "ex-wife married over 20 years "

3. Divorce <£=252.3<4)

9. Divorce «=»225
There was no error in divorce case in
failing to award attorney fees to wife,
where portion of property award was for
purpose of assisting wife to pay attorney
and no showing was made in trial as to the
nature and amount of fees

Trial court, in apportioning marital
property upon divorce, was required to at
least consider the value of the husband's
retirement account, and alternatives available for taking that value into account
would include requiring husband to pay
half of net present value to wife in annual
installments, or reapportioning property
distribution to offset that value
4. Divorce <S=>253(4)
Wife was entitled to finding in support
of denial of her request for a portion of the
assets of husband's medical assets, and it
was error to refuse to place present value
thereon on the ground that the assets were
futuristic
5 Divorce €=>252 3(1)

Goodwill is properly subject to eq
uitable distribution upon divorce
6 Divorce <S=>252.3(1)
Regardless of whether professional de
gree and professional practice mav in ap
propriate cases constitute marital property
subject to evaluation and distribution upon
divorce wifes request for property inter
est in husband's medical degree was map
propriate where the marriage was of long
duration and present earnings and business
assets provided a more accurate measure
of the true worth of the wife's investment
in her husband's degree
7. Divorce e=>237
Alimony award should, after marriage
of long duration and to the extent possible
equalize the parties respective standards
of living and maintain them at a level as
close as possible to the standard of living
enjoyed during the marriage
S Divorce c=210(2)
Ahmonv award of $1 200 per month
until husband's retirement and $600 per
month thereafter was an abuse of discre
tion where husband was a physician with
earnings of $6,000 per month wife had not
been employed for ,J0 vears husband had
substantial retirement assets, and wife

Pete N Vlahos, Ogden, for plaintiff and
appellant
C Gerald Parker, Ogden, for defendant
and respondent
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice
Plaintiff Betty Gardner appeals from a
decree awarding alimony and attorney fees
in a divorce action she brought against her
former husband, William Gardner We re
verse and remand for further considera
tion
Mr and Mrs Gardner were married at
Steels Tavern, Virginia, on April 17, 1950
No children were born to them but the
couple adopted two children who are now
both adults Earlv in the marriage Mrs
Gardner worked full time as a secretarv
while Mr Gardner completed his medical
training Mr Gardner also worked various
jobs, and his parents provided support in
the form of medical school tuition Mrs
Gardner has not worked since 1958 when
Mr Gardner completed his medical train
ing Mr Gardner is now employed as a
general surgeon, earning $6,000 per month
While married Mr and Mrs Gardner
acquired substantial real and personal
property Their major asset was a farm
including a home and equipment located
near Eden Ltah worth between $246 000
and $280 000 Other assets included Mr
Gardners mMJi<al assets and retirement
funds with in unctrtam valuation of be
tween $11 000 and $177 000, a contract for
the sale of stock in the Ogden Clinic Invest
merit Gompanv a certificate of deposit,
household furniture, furnishings and fix
tures, boats and automobiles sporting
equipment, and two horses and associated
equipment
At the time of divorce the

1078

Utah

748 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

couple's only outstanding debts were a
first mortgage on the family home and a
loan for the purchase of one automobile.
The trial court ordered that the farm,
home, and equipment be sold and the proceeds be divided equally Until the farm
was sold, Mrs Gardner was entitled to its
use, although she had to pay the mortgage,
taxes, and insurance. The court also ordered that the motor vehicles and boats be
sold and the proceeds divided equally, with
the exception of one personal automobile
for each party The household furnishings
and other items of personal property were
divided roughly equally, according to personal need Mr Gardner was awarded his
medical and business assets, including retirement funds, except Mrs Gardner was
awarded one third of the proceeds from the
sate of Che Old Ogdeci Chmc budding to pay
her attorne> fees They were to share
equally a monev market certificate The
^ourt granted Mrs Gardner $l,20u per
month alimony, to be reduced to $G00 per
month following Mr Gardner's retirement
Mrs Gardner was also to have a claim for
$50,000 against Mr Gardner's estate in the
event that he predeceased her
Mrs Gardner asks this Court to reverse
the judgment of the lower court She cites
Wooduatd i Woodward, 656 P 2d 431
(Utah 1982), for the proposition that she
has a spousal right to an equitable dihtnbution of Mr Gardner's retirement funds
She also asserts a property interest in his
medical degree and business and claims
that the alimony award was insufficient
Finally, she asks this Court for an award of
attorney fees
JJJ J;; J Jjvo/ve procevdjng, the LnaJ
court should make a distribution of proper
tv and income so that the parties may
readjust their lives to their new circum
stances as w< II as possiblt
Turner i
hutttf
<>n PJd h (l,Uh IW2). Mm
Donald r MacDonald 120 Utah 57,*, <Mb
P h\ 1066 <19">1) Although this Court ma\
modify decisions of the trial court, its ap
portionment of marital propertv will not be
disturbed unless it is < learlv unjust or a
clear abuse of discretion
Turner 649
P2d at *

The trial court awarded Mr, ^trftMim-retirement account and medical^^Hl
without placing a present value on^raSj
those assets The trial court «^fleOTHJ5c
those types of assets "futuristic** W ^ M t
rated that their value would be'utiEttiw
retirement The court did not attemjwM
resolve the differing valuations of th£?£c
sets and provided little explanation fonQU
award to Mr Gardner
%K^
Recently, in Acton v Delimit, 737 pjjj
996, 999 (Utah 1987), we noted:
* *'•*
Failure of the trial court to make fiSjl
ings on all material issues is reversible
error unless the facts in the record are
"clear, uncontroverted, and capable of
supporting only a finding in favor of the
judgment"
Kmkella v Baugh, 660
P 2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983)
The findings of fact must show that the court's
judgment or decree "follows logically
from, and is supported by, the evidence"
Smith v Smith, 726 P 2d 423, 426 (Utah
1986) The findings "should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by
which the ultimate conclusion on each
factual issue was reached" Rucker [v.
Dalton], 598 P 2d [1336] at 1338 [Utah
1979J Sec aLso Mountain States Legal
Foundation v Public Sennce Commission, 636 P2d 1047, 1051 (Utah 1981)
The trial court's statement in its findings
that the retirement account and Mr Gardner's medical assets are futuristic" was
apparently intended to mean that they
could not be given a present value or
should not for other reasons be taken into
account That however, does not follow
from the evidence presented at trial, nor is
it supported bv our cases Regardless of
how remote the full value of an asset is, it
still has present value The testimony adduced at trial d» voted t<> differing valua*
(ions b\ tht partes IIH nU d more precise
findings

|21 In Wooduard i Wooduatd, 656
I1 2d at 4 \l we recognized that retirement
benefits whether vested or not are a form
<>f deferred composition whith a court
should at least consider when dividing marital assets
\ right to deferred compensa-
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tion acquired during marriage, or that portion of one's right to deferred compensation acquired during marriage, should not
be entirely ignored in dividing assets, irrespective of when the vested funds are payable. Thus, marital property "encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed by the parties, whenever obtained
and from whatever source derived; and
this includes any such pension fund or insurance." Englert v. Englert, 576 P.2d
1274 (Utah 1978).
However, an award of a part of a
spouse's retirement funds may create significant problems. In some instances, marital assets are sparse, income is low, and an
award of an equitable share of retirement
assets might work a substantial hardship.
Courts have, however, awarded the value
of the assets on a periodic payment plan
'and, in some instances, have provided for
payments when payout begins. This alternative should be employed only in rare
instances. In Woodward, the Court stated:
Long term <mu deferred sharing ot financial interests are obviously too susceptible to continued strife and hostility, circumstances which our courts traditionally strive to avoid to the greatest extent
possible. . . .
. . . [VVJhere other assets for equitable
distribution are inadequate or lacking altogether, or where no present value can
be established and the parties are unable
to reach agreement, resort must be had
to a form of deferred distribution based
upon fixed percentages.
656 P.2d at 433 (quoting Kikkert v. Kikkert. 111 N.J.Super. 471, 478, 427 A.2d 76,
7^-80 (1981)).
Obviously, dividing retirement or pension
funds is not necessarily consistent with
principles of equitable distribution in all
cases. The purpose of divorce is to end
marriage and allow the parties to make as
much of a clean break from each other as
is reasonably possible. An award of deferred compensation which ties a couple
,together long after divorce can frustrate
that objective.
[3] Nevertheless, the division of retirement funds between two persons can be

accomplished when necessary For example, in Rayburn v. Ray burn, 738 P.2d 238
(Utah App.1987), a physician was required
to pay one-half the net present value of his
retirement plan, $56,850. to his former wife
in five annual installments. The court
awarded present value of the share to be
paid within five years to avoid 'leaving the
parties in a 'financial entanglement that
would continue for approximately twenty
or thirty years and would probably result
in further court hearings and cause future
animosity between the parties.'" Id. at
241-42. Rayburn provides a possible alternative for dealing with the value of the
retirement account in this case. Because
of the sizeable assets in this case, another
alternative would be reapportionment of
the property distribution to offset the value
of the retirement account.
In any event, it will be necessary on
remand to determine the value of the retirement account. The account has a
present value of between $73,000 and
$177,000, and the Court should at least
consider the value of the account in making
the property distribution.
Another alternative for the apportionment of property lies in the trial court's
discretion to award the entire value of a
solely owned professional corporation to
the husband. Dogu v. Dogu, 652 P.2d 1308
(Utah 1982). In Dogu. the earning power
of the corporation resulted entirely from
Dr. Dogu's continuing ability to work;
however, there were questions as to his
ability to do so. The trial court awarded
the wife savings certificates, bank accounts, and stock to offset the present liquid assets of the corporation (accounts receivable and bank accounts). The trial
court did not attempt to value the future
earnings potential of the corporation, presumably because of questions regarding
the ability of Dr. Dogu to continue to generate income for the corporation.
[4,5] The Ogden Clinic, of which Mr.
Gardner is a member, is a well-entrenched
institution, whose twenty-three members
have banded together in a business organization. It is not likely to be highly susceptible to earnings interruptions because
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of the ill health of one of its members.
The Ogden Clinic is not entirely valueless.
Mr. Gardner's share, using his own figures,
is worth at least $3,826 (partnership $3,726,
corporation $100). Mrs. Gardner's accountants value the business much higher. Neither gave consideration to the good will
inherent in the professional clinic.1 Mrs.
Gardner was entitled to findings in support
of the denial of her request for a portion of
those assets. Instead, the trial court disposed of the medical assets in the same
sentence in which it disposed of the retirement account.

453 A.2d 527 (1982); O'Brien v. O'Brie*
66 N.Y.2d 576, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 489 NJEfc
2d 712 (1985). It has similarly been thf
subject of discussion in our Court of Apl
peals. See Ray burn v. Ray burn, 738 P»2d
238 (Utah App.1987); Petersen v. Petersen;
737 P.2d 237 (Utah App.1987).
One authority has argued that educational achievements are susceptible to valuation,2 but there is judicial authority for the
proposition that the value of an education
does not fall within the common understanding of the concept of property:
An educational degree, such as an
M.B.A., is simply not encompassed even
by the broad views of the concept of
"property." It does not have an exchange value or any objective transferable value on an open market. It is
personal to the holder. It terminates on
death of the holder and is nor inheritable.
It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred,
conveyed, or pledged. An advanced degree is a cumulative product of many
years of previous education, combined
with diligence and hard work
It may
not be acquired by the mere expenditure
of money. It is Mmply an intellectual
achievement that may potentially assist
m the future acquisition of property. In
our view, it has none of the attributes of
property in the usual sense of that term.

The medical assets at issue here were not
included in the retirement account, but the
trial court seems to have assumed that
they were one and the same. In any event,
no findings of fact were made as to the
value of the medical assets. The award to
Mr. Gardner of his retirement funds and
medical assets may be proper and equitable. However, we cannot adequately
review the trial court's determinations on
the basis of the sparse findings before us.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a
valuation of the medical assets and retirement accounts and reconsideration of the
distribution of the marital property on the
basis of those findings
In addition, Mrs. Gardner assets an equitable and legal property interest in the
medical degree of her former spouse.
Whether professional degrees and professional practice constitute marital property
subject to valuation and distribution upon
the dissolution of a marriage has been the
subject of much debate in recent years,
especially in the wake of decisions where
such a valuation has been made. See, e.g.,
Inman v. In man, 648 S.W.2d 847 (Ky.
1982); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N J . 488,
1.

A marriage mas IK- analo^i/ed to a partnei
ship Upon dissolution oi the marital "pailner
ship,'' an equitable distribution should be based
on eonsidei ation of all assets, not just those that
s u r \ u e the trip to the bottom ol the balance
sheet
Where appropriate, value mav be given
to that "something in business which gives rea
vjnablc expectancy <>l preference in the race of
competition," c o m m o n l v known as good will
Jackson i< Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d HI. 8S. 41 S P 2d
667, 670 (1966)
The ability of a business to generate income
from its c o n t i n u e d patronage is c o m m o n l y re

In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429,
432, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (1978). See also Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488 at 4%, 453 A.2d 527 at
531.
The cases which have refused to hold
that professional degree&-and practice constitute marital property subject to valuation and distribution have nonetheless assessed and divided the value of the degree
terred to as \HHKI will
r,uod will is p i o p e r k
subject to equitable dislnt>ution u|K>n d i v o u e
.Vtr, <>K, Du^an \ Du^an. 92 \ J 423. 4S7 A 2d
1 (1981), Matter »j Marriage of tfeee_e, 91 Wash
2d 324, S88 f»2d I H 6 (1979)
Hut see Pie
1 reatment of (,'<MHJ Will m Dtxnrce
/^(needm^s,
18 Fam I O 213 (1984)
2.

See Fit/patrick & I)ou< eile, Can the I conunuc
Value of an Education Realh He Measured1. 21
J.Fdin.l. Si (1983)
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or practice on the basis of other legal and
equitable remedies These cases follow a
common fact pattern Typically, the hus
band is supported throughout a long gradu
ate or professional program by the working
wife, and the couple is divorced soon after
graduation In such cases, there are few
mantaJ assets to distribute, and the courts
have considered other ways of compensating the spouse In a limited number of
cases, the courts focus on the educational
degree or professional practice See generally In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263
N W 2d 885 (Iowa 1978), Mahoney, 91 N J
488, 453 A 2d 527, Inman, 648 S W 2d 847,
O'Brien, 66 N Y 2d 576, 498 N V S 2d 743.
489 X E 2d 712, and Hubbard v Hubbard,
603 P2d 747 (Okla 1979), for various theories of valuation

ble to that standard <»f l
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tially. Mrs. Gardner, however, has no pension and will qualify for social security
payments only as an "ex-wife married over
20 years." She will not qualify for regular
social security benefits until she has
worked another thirty-nine quarters. Because the likelihood of her providing for
her own retirement is small, we find that
the trial court's award is insufficient to
equalize the parties' standards of living
following Mr. Gardner's retirement
We reverse and remand for further proceedings in light of the above and in light
of the factors enumerated in Jones, 700
P.2d at 1075. On remand, the trial court
must evaluate the wife's ability to support
herself based on findings and conclusions
under the standards stated in Acton v.
Deliran, 737 P.2d 996. It is not clear from
the record before us that Mrs. Gardner will
be able to meet her monthly needs either
before or after Mr. Gardner's retirement,
and this is the focus of our concern. Our
review of the record therefore indicates
that the alimony award may have to be
increased.
However, explicit findings
based on the factors in Jones are needed to
support that conclusion.
[9J Finally, Mrs. Gardner asks this
Court to make an award of attorney fees.
The trial court made no specific award of
attorney fees. However, in its findings of
fact and conclusions of law, the trial court
made clear that an award of a one-third
interest in the Old Ogden Clinic building
account and the division of the money market certificate was for the purpose of assisting the wife to pay her attorney. Mr.
Gardner correctly notes that a request for
attorney fees must be accompanied by evidence at trial as to the nature and amount
of such fees. See Warren v. Warren, 655
P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1982). No such showing was made at trial, and the findings do
not support Mrs. Gardner's request. Insofar as we have approved the property settlement of the lower court, the award of
attorney fees made part of that settlement
is affirmed.
HALL, C.J., and DURHAM and
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.

HOWE, Justice (concurring and
dissenting).
I concur in the majority opinion exceptJM
that part dealing with alimony. As toihSfj
part, I dissent for the following reasot&p
First, in reversing and remanding for^T
valuation of the medical and retiremem
assets and a redistribution of marital prop,
erty on the basis of those findings, Mrs.
Gardner's financial position will undoubtedly improve and her income increase. This
increase will have a direct bearing on the
amount of alimony which she should be
awarded. It is premature for us to now
hold that the $1,200 per month or the $600
per month awarded by the trial court is
inadequate. It may well be that after the
redistribution of property is made, the
amounts awarded will be entirely fair and
could even be excessive. This is especially
true as to $600 alimony after Mr. Gardner's
retirement Any amount of his retirement
awarded to her on remand decreases her
need for alimony and his ability to pay i t
The trial judge recognized this reality when
he wrote in his memorandum decision:
Upon his retirement, the alimony shall
reduce to $600 per month. The reasons
for this reduction are: by the time of
retirement, the home should be sold and
the plaintiff should have liquid assets;
defendant's income will materially decrease; plaintiff will also receive some
social security benefits. It is my intent
in awarding to the defendant his medical
assets and retirement assets that alimony shall be paid therefrom and that the
plaintiff shall have a claim thereon as
against the defendant's estate if he
should predecease her. This claim shall
be in the amount of $50,000.
Second, the $l,700-per-month alimony requested by Mrs. Gardner was based on her
affidavit which listed her monthly needs at
that amount, but based on her assumption
that the court would allow her to continue
to live on the twenty-one-acre country estate of the parties on which is a six-bedroom home with garages for four cars, a
barn, and other outbuildings. Consequently, in arriving at her $I,700-per-month request, she included the monthly mortgage
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payment, the property taxes, insurance premiums on that property, monthly utilities
on that proj>erty, and amounts for the care
of the farm animals and for farm, garden,
and house maintenance and repairs. However, the trial court did not award her the
country estate or allow her to permanently
slay there, but ordered that the parties sell
the property as soon as possible. The majority opinion does not assail this determination. The sale of the property ordered
by the court necessarily eliminated many of
the monthly e x c u s e s which formed a basis
for the $1,700 alimony request. The trial
court, therefore, acted properly in excluding those items of expense in determining a
reasonable amount of monthly alimony and
presumably included instead the cost of
Mrs. Gardner's living in smaller and less
expensive quarters. On cross-examination,
Mrs. Gardner admitted that her cost of
living would be less if she did not live on
the estate. Thus, the $1,200 awarded by
the trial court was clearly within the range
of the evidence before the court The majority Jot%> not claim that $1,200 was
"clearly erroneous" as rule 52, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, requires us to conclude
before we may upset findings of fact by
the trial court.
We have always accorded trial courts
considerable latitude in fixing alimony.
Yet here, the majority sweeps aside the
trial court's judgment because is only onefifth of Mr. Gardner's monthly income and
is insufficient to "equalize the parties' standard of living." Insofar as this writer
knows, reasonable and fair alimony has
never been expressed as a percentage of
the husband's monthly income. This is a
new concept, completely foreign to the test
recognized in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072
(Utah 1985), for determining an alimony
award. Since the monthly income of divorced husbands is not all the same, the
Jtnonthly needs and financial conditions of
divorced wives vary widely, and debts and
Other factors have to be considered, percentages should not be employed or relied
Finally, I strongly dissent from the resated references in the majority opinion
a t alimony is to "equalize" the financial

position of the parties after their divorce.
Again, this concept is contrary to the three
factors to be considered which we enumerated in Jones v. Jones, supra: (1) the financial condition and needs of the wife, (2) the
ability of the wife to produce a sufficient
income for herself, and (3) the ability of the
husband to provide support. We have said
that the wife is entitled to enjoy as near as
possible the same standard of living she
enjoyed during the marriage and she
should be prevented from becoming a public charge. English v. English, 565 P.2d
409, 411 (Utah 1977). But this is not the
same as "equalizing" their incomes. The
instant case is a good example. Mr. Gardner is a highly skilled surgeon earning
$f>,000 per month. Mrs. Gardner was not
employed at the time of the divorce. She
thought she could maintain the standard of
living to which she had become accustomed
if she received $1,700 per month alimony.
If their financial positions after divorce are
to be equal, she presumably should have
$2,000 per month aiimony. I do not think
the majority intends that result.
The object of divorce is to set the parties
free of each other after an equitable division of property is made and, if needed, an
award of alimony is made which will enable
both parties to maintain as near as possible
the standard of living they enjoyed during
the marriage. The parties then go their
separate ways and attempt to rebuild their
lives. But because of the disparity in their
earning ability, the wife here, who has
training as a secretary but has not been
employed for thirty-three years, will never
earn as much as her husband-surgeon.
Our cases do not suggest that the divorce
decree should attempt to cure this disparity
by "equalizing" their future incomes.
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press the disputed evidence. The officers
in this case made no attempt to obtain a
search warrant For the reasons discussed
above, I do not think that the circumstances justified this failure.
ZIMMERMAN, J., concurs in the
dissenting opinion of DURHAM, J.

Kathryn Myrna NEWMEYER, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Jeddy Paul NEWMEYER, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 19183.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 13, 1987.
Divorce was sought The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Jay E.
Banks, J., granted divorce, divided property, awarded alimony, and awarded attorney
fees to former wife. Former husband appealed. The Supreme Court, Zimmerman,
J., held that (1) trial court properly credited wife with inheritances used to purchase
homes and properly valued house; (2) wife
was entitled to annual alimony of $1; and
(3) wife failed to establish right to attorney
fee award of $1,423.

much lower contribution. U.C.A.1953, 303-5(1).
2. Divorce <s=>252.3(3)
Appropriate treatment of property
brought into marriage by one party may
vary from divorce case to divorce case;
overriding consideration is that ultimate division be equitable—that property be fairly
divided between parties, given contributions during marriage and circumstances at
time of divorce. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5(1).
3. Divorce <s=>253(2)
Evidence supported trial court's conclusion as to amount of money contributed
by former wife from her inheritances to
purchase homes and as to amount of former husband's contribution to purchase
homes. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5(1); Rules Civ.
Proc., Rule 52(a).
4. Divorce <s=>253(3)
Evidence <s=*574
Trial court dividing home upon divorce
did not abus*» Hi^cretior b,r re^cctin0* expert
appraisal of $122,000 and appraisal of
$112,000 and by valuing house at $117,000.
U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5(1).
5. Pleading <3=>427
Question as to whether former wife or
former husband was entitled to tax deduction for child was tried by parties without
objection and could be decided by trial
court awarding deduction to wife, even
though her initial prayer for relief consented to husband's use of deduction. Rules
Civ.Proc., Rule 15(b).

Affirmed, but attorney fee award
stricken.
Howe, J., concurred and filed opinion.
Durham, J., concurred in part, dissented in part, and filed opinion.

6. Divorce «=»252.3(1)
Amount of alimony awarded after divorce and relative earning capabilities of
parties are relevant to determine equitable
division of marital assets. U.C.A.1953, 303-5(1).

1. Divorce «=>252.5(1)
Trial court properly exercised discretion by crediting former wife with inheritances used to purchase homes and by
crediting former husband with equal share
of appreciation of value in homes despite

7. Divorce <s=»237
Alimony is to be awarded after consideration of three factors: receiving spouse's
financial condition and needs; receiving
spouse's ability to earn adequate income;
and providing spouse's ability to provide
support
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8. Divorce <s»2l<)<2)
Former wife was entitled to annual
alimony of $1, even though former wife
received majority of assets of marriage and
was working at time of divorce; wife had
worked only episodically at low-paying jobs
during two decades of marriage and did not
have opportunity to build retirement fund
9. Divorce 0=227(1)
Former wife failed to provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate that award
of $1,423 in attorney fees was reasonable;
there was no separate showing of hours,
rate, or community standard.
Glen M. Kichman, Salt Lake fiU, In
appellant.
J. Bruce Reading, Michael W. Spence,
Salt Lake City, for respondent.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
Plaintiff Kathryn Newmeyer brought
this divorce action against her husband,
Jeddy Newmeyer. The trial court granted
Kathryn custody of the couple's minor
child and awarded her the bulk of the property, one dollar per year as alimony, and
attorney fees. Jeddy appeals. He contends that the property division was incorrect, that Kathryn should not have been
awarded any alimony, and that the evidence is insufficient to support an award of
attorney fees. We agree only with the
third contention and vacate the award of
attorney fees. The judgment is otherwise
affirmed.
The Newmeyers were married just over
twenty years. During that period, they
owned three homes in succession. During
the holding periods, each appreciated. The
trial court awarded Jeddy an automobile,
all rights to his pension plan, miscellaneous
household items, his savings of approximately $7,000, and an equitable lien against
the couple's current home in the amount of
$32,606. The court awarded Kathryn the
balance of the equity in the home, valued in
excess of $80,000, two automobiles, miscellaneous household items, her savings of
approximately $17,000, one dollar per year
alimony, and $1,423 in attorney fees. Ka-

thryn also was allowed to take an income
tax deduction for the couple's minor child
for the tax year 1982. Jeddy was required
to pay $200 per month child support and
was awarded the tax deduction for the
minor child for all the years following 1982.
Jeddy challenges numerous aspects of
the property division. However, he concentrates his attention on the division of the
equity in the home. He challenges the
findings on the relative contribution of
each party and the current value of the
home. Regarding the first of these issues
—the contribution of each party—he contends that the trial court erred in finding
that Kathryn should receive credit for substantial amounts she received from inheritances that were invested in the homes
early in the marriage
In dividing the marital estate, the trial
court may make such orders concerning
property distribution and alimony as are
equitable. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1)
(1984 & Supp.1987). In making such orders, the trial court is permitted broad latitude, and its judgment is not to be lightly
disturbed, so long as it exercises its discretion in accordance with the standards set
by this Court. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d
1072, 1074 (Utah 1985); see Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 119 (Utah 1986). It is
therefore incumbent on the appealing party
to prove that the trial court's division violates those standards, seef e.g., Jones, 700
P.2d at 1074, or that the trial court's factual findings upon which the division is
grounded are clearly erroneous under Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).
I I, 2) Jeddy concedes that Kathryn put
money from her inheritances into the
homes. However, he argues that because
the inheritances received by Kathryn came
into the marriage many years ago and
were committed to the common venture of
purchasing a home, the trial court was
bound to divide this contribution equally
between both parties. There is nothing in
our cases that mandates such a result.
The appropriate treatment of property
brought into a marriage by one party may
vary from case to case. Compare Workman v. Workman (>52 P 2d 931, 933 (Utah
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1982) (husband's property acquired prior to
marriage properly a part of marital assets
to be divided upon divorce), and Jackson v.
Jackson, 617 P.2d 338, 340-41 (Utah 1980)
(title to marital property prior to divorce
not binding on trial court's distribution),
with Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705, 706
(Utah 1982) (inheritance acquired during
marriage properly excluded from valuation
of marital assets), and Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980) (not
unreasonable for trial court to withdraw
from marital property the equivalent of
assets brought into marriage). The overriding consideration is that the ultimate
division be equitable—that property be fairly divided between the parties, given their
contributions during the marriage and their
circumstances at the time of the divorce.
See Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 420 (Utah
1986).
In the present case, the circumstances
warrant the treatment given the inheritances by the trial court. Under any version of
the facts, it is readily apparent that Kathryn paid the lion's share of the cost of
the homes from money she received
through inheritances. Moreover, the trial
court was more than fair to Jeddy by crediting him with an equal share in the appreciation of the value of the homes despite
his much lower contribution. Therefore,
we conclude that the trial court exercised
its discretion within the bounds set by our
cases when it credited Kathryn with the
inheritances she put into the homes.
[3] Jeddy also disputes the trial court's
factual determination of the amount each
party contributed toward the purchase of
the homes. There was conflicting evidence
on this point at trial. Evidence fixed Kathryn's probable contribution at $55,000 to
$60,000 and Jeddy's at $7,000 to $12,000.
Jeddy's present challenge to the trial
court's factual findings as to the relative
contributions of the parties amounts to
nothing more than an attempt to retry the
matter on appeal. There was evidence supporting the positions of both parties. It
was for the trial court to resolve the conflicts. We will not overturn such a factual
resolution unless the appellant first mar-

shals all the evidence supporting the trial
court's finding and then demonstrates that
that evidence, when compared to the contrary evidence, is so lacking as to warrant
the conclusion that clear error has been
committed. Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a); see Harline v. Campbell, 728 P.2d 980, 982 (Utah
1986); Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d
1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). In the present
case, Jeddy has not begun to meet this
burden. Therefore, we reject his attack on
the trial court's determination of the relative contributions of the parties.
Jeddy next attacks the trial court's findings as to the market value of the current
home. Jeddy's expert witness testified
that the house was worth $122,000, while
Kathryn's testified that the value of the
house was $112,000. The trial judge fixed
the value of the house at $117,000. Based
upon that finding, the appreciation in the
value of the couple's successive homes was
approximately $50,000. Jeddy argues that
in fixing the value at $117,000, the court
improperly "split" the difference between
the values fixed by the experts. He argues
that his expert should have been believed.
[4] This argument, like the one that
preceded it, is nothing but an attempt to
have this Court substitute its judgment for
that of the trial court on a contested factual issue. This we cannot do under Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). In apparent
recognition of this proposition, Jeddy
masks this claim as a legal argument by
contending that the trial judge acted improperly in splitting the difference between
the experts. That argument is, of course,
utterly lacking in merit. It is elementary
that a judge is not bound to believe one
witness's testimony to the total exclusion
of that of another witness. When acting
as the trier of fact, the trial judge is entitled to give conflicting opinions whatever
weight he or she deems appropriate. See
Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 P.2d 598, 603
(Utah 1983); see also Goodmundson v.
Goodmundson, 201 Mont 535, 655 P.2d
509, 511 (1982) (in adopting proposed values for marital assets, trial court may average conflicting values given by experts to
arrive at an equitable solution). Therefore,
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we hold that the district rourt did not
abuse its discretion in determining that the
value of the home was $117,000.
[5J Jeddy next argues that the trial
court improperly credited Kathryn with the
1982 tax deduction for the minor child because under the prayer for relief contained
in her initial complaint in this action, she
asked that Jeddy be allowed that deduction.
Kathryn did not amend her complaint to
change the prayer for relief; therefore,
Jeddy argues, the trial court lacked the
authority to award her the 1982 tax deduction. Whatever the state of the pleadings,
the record indicates that at trial, the entitlement to the 1982 tax deduction became
a matter of dispute between the parties and
was adjudicated without objection. Under
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b), a trial
court is permitted to decide issues that are
not raised by the pleadings when (i) they
are tried by the parties and (ii) the failure
to amend the initial pleadings to conform to
the evidence in no way impairs the trial
court's ability to resolve such an issue.
Both of these requirements were mei. V/c
therefore conclude that it was proper for
the tnal judpe to consider the issue
[6] Jeddy's other contentions regarding
the trial court's property distribution lack
merit.1
[7, 8] Jeddy next contends that the trial
court abused its discretion by awarding
plaintiff one dollar per year alimony. Alimony is to be awarded after considering
three factors: the receiving spouse's financial condition and needs; the receiving
spouse's ability to earn an adequate income; and the providing spouse's ability to
provide support. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d
at 1075. The record indicates that Kathryn
received the majority of the assets of the
marriage. However, she appears to have a
relatively poor ability to earn an income
sufficient to maintain as nearly as possible
1. !l is worth noting thai in attacking the piop<i
ty distribution, Jeddy fails entirely to take account of the fact that Kathryn received an alimony award of only one dollar per year. In
determining whether a certain division of property is equitable, neither the trial court nor this
Court considers the property division in a vac

the sUndard of living that the parties en
joyed when married. Although working at
the time of the divorce, during the course
t t her two decades of marriage to Jeddy,
Kathryn was employed only episodically,
for brief periods, and at low-paying jobs.
She did not have the opportunity to build
up a retirement fund. Yet the trial court
did not give her any interest in Jeddy's
pension. Finally, the evidence suggests
that Jeddy has better future income prospects than Kathryn, In light of these circumstances, however, Kathryn only received an alimony award of one dollar per
year, presumably to preserve her right to
seek an increase should there be a material
change in circumsUnces in the future.
Given these facts, Jeddy's claim that the
trial court abused its discretion in awarding
any alimony is utterly without merit. See,
e.g., Stephens v. Stephens, 728 P 2d 991,
992-93 (UUh 1986).
[9] Jeddy's final contention is that the
trial court abused its discretion in awarding
Kathryn $1,423 in attorney fees.
An
award of attorney fees in divorce ?a.se?
4
must be supported by evidence that it is
reasonable in amount and reasonably needed by the party requesting the award."
Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d at 419 (citing Beats
v. Beats, 682 P.2d 862 (Utah 1984)). Because ample evidence of Kathryn's financial condition was before the court, we reject Jeddy's argument that the trial court's
finding of need was unsupported by the
evidence. On the other hand, it is incumbent on the party requesting attorney fees
to demonstrate "the necessity of the number of hours dedicated, the reasonableness
of the rate charged in light of the difficulty
oi the case and the result accomplished,
and the rates commonly charged for divorce actions in the community/' Beals,
682 P.2d at 864 (quoting Kerr v. Kerr, 610
P.2d 1380, 1384-85 (Utah 1980)); accord
Delatore v. Delatore, 680 P.2d 27, 28 (Utah
inn I he amount of alimony awarded and the
relative earning capabilities of the parties are
also relevant, because the relative abilities of the
spouses to support themselves after the divorce
are pertinent to an equitable determination of
the division of the fixed assets of the marriage.
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1984). Kathryn failed to provide sufficient
evidence to demonstrate that the fees were
reasonable. The evidence regarding attorney fees consisted solely of Kathryn's testimony. There was no separate showing of
the hours, rate, or community standard.
Because Kathryn failed to carry her burden and establish the proper evidentiary
basis for the award, we hold that it was an
abuse of discretion for the trial court to
award her $1,423 in attorney fees.
The divorce decree is affirmed, but the
award of attorney fees to plaintiff is stricken. Costs to respondent.
HALL, C.J., and STEWART,
Associate C.J., concur.
HOWE, Justice: (concurring).
I concur. This case presents a recurring
issue before this Court, viz., the division of
property inherited or received by gift by
one spouse from his or her family either
before or during marriage. No rules to
guide the trial court have been expressed
by the legislature or by this Court over the
past years except the illusory standard that
the ultimate division should be fair and
equitable. While I recognize that trial
judges must have flexibility and discretion
in dividing property, I believe that such
inherited or donated property should be
dealt with more consistently and according
to more definite and meaningful guidelines.
Typical of our expressions dealing with inherited property is the following language
found in Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135
(Utah 1987) (a case in which I concurred),
where we said:
[I]n appropriate circumstances equity requires that each party recover the separate property brought into or received
during the marriage.
However, no mention was made of what
comprise "appropriate circumstances/'
From my review of the cases decided by
this Court in recent years, many of which
are cited in the instant case and in the
footnotes to Burke v. Burke, supra, no
discernible pattern of treating inherited or
donated property is apparent. For instance, in Burke, Mrs. Burke, ten years
into the marriage, inherited from her moth-

er's estate three and one-half acres of
unimproved land, then worth less than
$5,000. Without any improvements being
made to the property or any effort expended by either party, the property appreciated at the time of divorce to $35,000 per
acre. The trial court awarded the property
solely to Mrs. Burke, giving Mr. Burke no
part of the original value ($5,000) or its
appreciation during the marriage ($117,500). This Court refused to disturb that
award.
Similarly, in Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d
705, 706 (Utah 1982), we affirmed a divorce
decree awarding to each party in general
the real and personal property he or she
brought to the marriage or inherited during the marriage. We there said:
Following the principle we have approved
in cases like Georgedes v. Georgedes,
Utah, 627 P.2d 44 (1981); Jesperson v.
Jesperson, Utah, 610 P.2d 326 (1980);
and Humphreys v. Humphreys, Utah,
52U P.2d 193 (1974), the district cuujt
concluded that each party should, in general, receive the real and personal property he or she brought to the marriage or
inherited during the marriage.
Without any mention or recognition of
the principle referred to in the above quotation, we have in other cases approved a
division among the parties of property inherited or donated to one party prior to or
during the marriage. Argyle v. Argyle,
688 P.2d 468 (Utah 1984); Bushell v. Bushell, 649 P.2d 85 (Utah 1982); Dubois v.
Dubois, 29 Utah 2d 75, 504 P.2d 1380
(1973); Weaver v. Weaver, 21 Utah 2d 166,
442 P.2d 928 (1968). No case has been
found where we have reversed a trial
court's disposition of such property.
A middle approach was taken in the instant case. Mr. Newmeyer was awarded
no part of his wife's inheritance, but he
was allowed to share equally in the appreciation of the properties in which her inheritance was invested. Yet I am unable to
discern why it was "fair and equitable" to
deny to Mr. Burke that which was given to
Mr. Newmeyer.
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While 1 re<ogni/e that tith case has its
own unique set of circumstances, I am concerned with the lack of consistency in treat
mg inherited and donated property \\ th
out more definite rules, each party takes
his or her chances that the particular trial
judge assigned to hear the case on that
given day will perceive it to be fair and
equitable to divide or not to divide such
property I believe that some general
rules should at least be articulated and
followed
The Court's opinion in Burke v Burke,
supra, repeated the factors which we enunciated in Pinion v Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67
P2d 265 (1937), that are generally to be
considered in making property divisions
No guidance, however, was given as to
when it would be appropriate to divide inherited or donated property We would be
doing a service to the Bar and to the trial
bench to be more definite m our treatment
of such property It is no wonder that so
many cases involving such propert) haw
been appealed, since the "losing" party in
comparing his or her case with other cases
decided b> tins Court can discern no rational basis for the disparate treatment he or
she has received
Legislative guidance would be helptul on
this question Utah Code Ann § 30-2-1
expresses a legislative intent that property
of a manned woman acquired by gift or
inheritance should remain her estate and
property To what extent should that rule
be modified when a divorce occurs? See
Izatt ? Izait f>27 P ?d 19 (Utah 1981)
DURHAM, Justice (toncuimiK AIHI
dissenting).
1 concur in the majority opinion except
for its vacation of the award of attorney
fees. The standard of reasonableness set
forth by the majority is entirely correct
but in view of the pleadings, discovery,
pretrial appearances, full day's trial, and
number and complexity of the issues, all of
which are patent on the face of the record
(and therefore obvious also to the tnal
judge), I think that the tnal courl had
sufficient information to assess reasonableness. Plaintiff established that the fees

were charged dnd du tht amount itselt
proves that counsel devoted approximately
17 to 18 hours at $80 per hour, or approximately 14 to 15 hours at $100 per hour, or
even 28 to 29 hours at $50 per hour Keeping in mind that the trial itself took a full
day and that there was a pretrial heanng
on support and at least one deposition taken by defendant's counsel, I have no difficulty taking judicial notice that the fee of
$1,423 was reasonable In view of plaintiff's need, I think it inappropriate to deny
her the assistance ordered h\ the trial
court
: KEY NUMBER SYSTEM

3>

SALT LAKE CITY Plaintiff
and Respondent,
John 1UERO, Defendant unti ^[ipdiant.
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Defendant was convicted of dnving under the influence by the Fifth Circuit
Court, Salt Lake County, Sheila K
McCleve, by jury verdict. Defendant appealed The Court of Appeals, Davidson,
J , held that (1) the tnal court did not
abuse its discretion by refusing to dismiss
for cause potential juror, who stated that
his wife had been "broadsided b) a drunk
dnver," and (2) the tnal court was not
required to question potential jurors on
whether they believed penalties involved
were too harsh >r too lenient
Affirmed.
1 J u r ) <*->105U>t

The trial court did not abuse its discretion, m prosecution for dnving under the
influence, by refusing to dismiss for cause
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1986 Amendments. Subsec (c). Pub L ^ 9 514. vj 103(b), redesignated former subsec. (e) as
(c) and struck out prior subsec (c) provision for
an additional exemption for taxpayer or spouse
aged 65 or more.

Kffective Date of 19K6 Amendment. Amendment of this section bs section 103 of Pub I
99-514 applicable to taxable vears beginning after
Dec. 31. 1986. see section 151(a) of Pub.L 99
514. set out as a note under section 1 of this title.

Pub L ^ ( >-514. § l.K47<b)<3). substituted "section 22(e)" for "section 37(e)" in par. (a)(5)

\ m e n d m e n t bv sections lhOl to 1H80 of Pub.L
9^-514 effective as if included in the provisions of
the Tax Reform Act of 19*4, Pub.L. 98-369.
except as otherwise provided, see section 1881 of
Pub.L 99-514. set out as .» note under section 48
of this title

Subsec (d)
Pub L 9M-5I4, $ 103(b). redesignated as subsec (d) former subsec (f). as amended
by Pub.L. 99-514. $ 103(a), and struck out prior
subsec (d) provision for an additional exemption
for blindness of taxpayer or spouse.
Subsec. (e). Pub.L. 99-514. § 103(b). redesignated former subsec. (e) a.s (c)
Subsec. (f).
Pub.L 99-514. § 103(a) added
subsec ( 0 "exemption a m o u n t " provision and
struck out prior "exemption a m o u n t " provision
reading: " F o r purposes of this section, the term
'exemption amount' means, with respect to any
taxable year. $1,000 increased b> an amount equal
to SI.(XX) multiplied bv the cost-of-living adjustment (as defined in section 1(f)(3)) for the calendar year in which the taxable year begins. If the
amount determined under the preceding sentence
is not a multiple of $10, such amount shall be
rounded to the nearest multiple of S10 (or if such
amount is a multiple of $5, such amount shall be
increased to the next highest multiple of S10).";
the "exemption a m o u n t " provision redesignated
by Pub.L. 99-514. § 103(b), as subsec (d).
1984 Amendment.
3h9 added par. P )

Subsec. (e)(5)

§ 152.

Lffective Date of 1981 Amendment. Amendment by section 104 of Pub L ^7-34 applicable to
taxable years beginning after Dec. 31. 1984, see
section 104(e) of Pub.I 97-34. set out as a note
under section I of this title
Legislative History. For legislative history and
purpose of Pub.l
98-369. see 1984 U.S.Code
Cong and Adm News, p 697. See. also, P u b L
99-514. 1986 L'.S.GxJe Cong, and Adm.News, p
4075.
I,aw Review Commentaries
Domestic relations tax
L Rev. 251 (1984/85).

reform.

20 G o n / a g a

Pub L 9 8 -

1981 Amendment. Subsecs. (b), (c). (dM»). (2),
(eWl).
Pub.L. 97-34. § KH(cKI). substituted
" t h e exemption a m o u n t " for "SI,(XX)" wherever
appearing
Subsec. (0.
subsec (f).

Kffective Date of 1984 Amendment. Section
426(b) of P u b L 98-369 provided that: " T h e
amendment made by subsection (a) [enacting subsec (e)(5) of this section) shall apply to taxable
years beginning after December 31. 1984."

Pub L 97-34. § 104(c)(2). added

Notes of Decisions
2.

Generally

No exemption or deduction existed for cost of
providing taxpayer's family with the "American
Standard of good living." Crimes v. C.I.R., C.A.
9. 1986. 806 F.Zd 1451.

Dependent defined

(a) General definition.—For purposes of this subtitle, the term "dependent"
means any of the following individuals over half of whose support, for the calendar
year in which the taxable year of the taxpayer begins, was received from the
taxpayer (or is treated under subsection (c) or (e) as received from the taxpayer):
(1) A son or daughter of the taxpayer, or a descendant of either,
(2) A stepson or stepdaughter of the taxpayer,
(3) A brother, sister, stepbrother, or stepsister of the taxpayer,
(4) The father or mother of the taxpayer, or an ancestor of either,
(5) A stepfather or stepmother of the taxpayer,
(6) A son or daughter of a brother or sister of the taxpayer,
(7) A brother or sister of the father or mother of the taxpayer,
(8) A son-in-law, daughter-in-law, father-in-law, mother-in-law, brother-in-law,
or sister-in-law of the taxpayer, or
(9) An individual (other than an individual who at any time during the taxable
year was the spouse, determined without regard to section 7703, of the taxpayer) who, for the taxable year of the taxpayer, has as his principal place of abode
the home of the taxpayer and is a member of the taxpayer's household.
(b) Rules relating to general definition.—For purposes of this section—
(1) The terms "brother" and "sister" include a brother or sister by the
halfblood.
(2) In determining whether any of the relationships specified in subsection (a)
or paragraph (1) of this subsection exists, a legally adopted child of an individual
(and a child who is a member of an individual's household, if placed with such
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individual by an authorized placement agency for legal adoption by such
individual), or a foster child of an individual (if such child satisfies the requirements of subsection (a)(9) with respect to such individual), shall be treated as a
child of such individual by blood.
(3) The term "dependent" does not include any individual who is not a citizen
or national of the United States unless such individual is a resident of the United
States or of a country contiguous to the United Suites. The preceding sentence
shall not exclude from the definition of "dependent" any child of the taxpayer
legally adopted by him, if, for the taxable year of the taxpayer, the child has as
his principal place of abode the home of the taxpayer and is a meml>er of the
taxpayer's household, and if the taxpayer is a citizen or national of the United
States.
(4) A payment to a wife which is includible in the gross income of the wife
under section 71 or 682 shall not be treated as a payment by her husband for the
support of any dependent.
(5) An individual is not a member of the taxpayer's household .f at any unduring the taxable year of the taxpayer the relationship ht»twe<-n vaeh md;\ !<!-•. •
and the taxpayer is in violation of local law.
(c) Multiple support agreements.—For purposes of subsection (a), over half of
the support of an individual for a calendar year shall be treated as received from the
taxpayer if—
(1) no one person contributed over half of such support;
(2) over half of such support was received from persons each of whom, but
for the fact that he did not contribute over half of such support, would have
been entitled to claim such individual as a dependent for a taxable year
beginning in such calendar year;
(3) the taxpayer contributed over 10 percent of such support; and
(4) each person described in paragraph (2) (other than the taxpayer) who
contributed over 10 percent of such support files a written declaration (in such
manner and form as the Secretary may by regulations prescribe) that he will not
claim such individual as a dependent for any taxable year beginning in such
calendar year
(d) Special support test in case of • ;ti n lei its.—ror purposes oi subsection {&>, in
the case of any individual who is—
( D a son, stepson, daughter, or stepdaughter of the taxpayer (within the
meaning of this section), and
(2) a student (within the meaning of section 151(cM4n,
amounts received as scholarships for study at an educational organization described
in section 170(b)(l)(A)(ii) shall not be taken into account in determining whether such
individual received more than half of his support from the taxpayer.
(e) Supporl
-J • diwircrd parents, etc.—
(1) Custodial pa-«
*->-: • '.^-<*n -Except as otherwise provided in this
subsection, if—
(A) a child (as defined in section 151(c)(3)) receives over half of his
support during the calendar year from his parents—
(i) who are divorced or legally separated under a decree of divorce or
separate maintenance,
Hi) who are separated under a written separation agreement, or
(iii) who live apart at all times during the last 6 months of the
calendar year, and
(B) such child is in the custody of one or both of his parents for more
than one-half of the calendar year,
such child shall be treated, for purposes of subsection (a), as receiving over half
of his support during the calendar year from the parent having custody for a
greater portion of the calendar year (hereinafter in this subsection referred to as
the "custodial parent").
(2) Exception where custodial parent release* claim to exemption for the
year.—A child of parents described in paragraph (1> shall be treated as having
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received over half of his support during a calendar.year from the noncustodial
parent if (A) the custodial parent si^ns a written declaration (in such manner and
form as the Secretary may by regulations prescribe) that such custodial
parent will not claim such child as a dependent for any taxable year
beginning in such calendar year, and
(B) the noncustodial parent attaches such written declaration to the
noncustodial parent's return for the taxable year beginning during such
calendar year.
For purposes of this subsection, the term "noncustodial parent" means the
parent who is not the custodial parent.
(3) Exception for multiple-support agreement.—This subsection shall not
apply in any case where over half of the support of the child is treated as having
been received from a taxpayer under the provisions of subsection (c).
(•I) Exception for certain pre-1985 instruments.—
(A) In K**neral.—\ child of parents described in paragraph (1) shall r>e
treated as having received over half his support during a calendar year
from the noncustodial parent if—
(i) a qualified pre-19Hf> instrument between the parents applicable to
the taxable year beginning in such calendar year provides that the
noncustodial parent shall be entitled to any deduction allowable under
section 151 for such child, and
(ii) the noncustodial parent provides at least $t>00 for the support of
such child during such calendar year.
For purposes of this subparagraph, amounts expended for the support of a
child or children shad be treated as received from the noncustodial parent to
the extent that such parent provided amounts for such support.
(B) Qualified pre-1985 instrument.—For purposes of this paragraph, the
term "qualified pre-li)8f> instrument" means any decree of divorce or
separate maintenance or written agreement—
(i) which is executed before January 1, H*S;">.
(ii) which on such date contains the provision described in subparagraph (A){i), and
(iii) which is not modified on or after such 'late in a modification
which expressly provides that this paragraph shall not apply to such
decree or agreement.
(5) Special rule for support received from new spouse of parent.—For
purposes of this subsection, in the case of the remarriage of a parent, support of
a child received from the patent's spouse shall be treated as received from the
parent,
(ft) (TOSS reference.—

For provision treating child as dependent of both parents for
purposes of medical expense deduction, see section 213(d)(4).
(Aug. 16, 1954. c 736. 68A Stat. 43; Aug. 9, 19f>f>, c. 693, § 2. 69 Suit. 626; Sept. 2. 1958. Pub.L
8.V866. Title I. § 4(aHc). 72 Slut. 1607; Sept. 23. 1959, Pub.L. 86-376. § 1(a), 73 Stat. 699; Aug.
31, 1967, Pub.L 90-78. § 1. 81 Stat. 191; Dec. 30. 1969. Pub.L 91-172. Title IX. § 912(a). 83 Stat.
722; Oct. 27. 1972. Pub L 92-580. § 1(a). 86 Stat. 1276; Oct. 4, 1976. Pub.L. 94-455. Title XIX.
§§ 1901(aX24), (bM7MB>. (8MA). l906(bHl3KA), Title XXI. § 2139(a). 90 Stat. 1767. 1794. 1834. 1932;
July 18. 1984. Pub.L 98-369, Title IV, §§ 423(a), 482(b)(2). 98 Stat. 799. 848; Oct. 22. 1986. Pub.L.
99-514. Title I. § 104(b)(1)(B). (3). Title XIII. § 1301(j)(8). KM) Stat. 2104, 2105, 2658.)
1986 Amendment. Subsec. (aM9) Pub.L 99514. § 1301(JX8), substituted reference to section
"7703" for "143"
Subsec. (d)(2)
PubL 99-5)4. § 104(b)(3).
substituted "section !51(c)W for "section
15l<eH4r.
Subsec.
(eMIXA).
Pub.L
99-514.
§ !04<bKlKB). substituted reference to "section
15I(CX3)" for "section l5l(eX3)"
1984 Amendment. Subsec. (e). I'ub.L 9«_3r>9,
§ 423(a). in substantially revising support tot

provisions, enacted par. (1) custodial parent exemption, former par (I) declaring the general rule
that where a child received over one-half of his
calendar year support from parents who were
divorced or legally separated under a decree of
divorce or separate maintenance, or were separated under a written separation agreement, and the
child was in the custody of one or both parents for
more than one-half of the calendar year, the child
would be treated as receiving over half of his
support from the parent having custody for a
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30-3-4-4. Jurisdiction of commissioner — Referral of cases
to court.
(1) All domestic relations matters, including orders to show cause, pretrial
conferences, petitions for modification of a divorce decree, scheduling conferences, and all other applications for relief, except ex parte motions, shall be
referred to the court commissioner before any hearing may be scheduled before the district court judge, unless otherwise ordered.
(2) The court commissioner shall, after hearing any motion or other application for relief, recommend entry of an order, and shall make a written
recommendation as to each matter heard. Should the parties not consent to
the recommended order, the matter shall be referred for further disposition by
a district judge.
(3) Any party objecting to the recommended order or seeking further hearing before a district judge shall, within ten days of the entry of the commissioner's recommendations, provide notice to the commissioner's office and opposing counsel that the recommended order is not acceptable or that further
hearing is desired. The commissioner shall then refer the matter to a district
judge for further hearing, conference, or trial. If no objection or request for
further hearing is made within ten days, the party is deemed to have consented to entry of an order in conformance with the commissioner's recommendation.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-4.4, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 151, § 5.

30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health
care of parties and children — Court to have continuing jurisdiction - Custody *nd visitation —
Termination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, and parties. The court shall
include the following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; and
(b> if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental
care insurance for the dependent children.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately
cared for, it may include an order allowing the non-custodial parent to provide
the day care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or
training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or
new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the
29
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children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental can\ or the distribution of the property as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and oilier
relatives, the court shall consider the welfare of the child.
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage
is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if
the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his
rights are determined.
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further
established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or association is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume.
(7) When a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions
of a court order is made and denied, the court may order the petitioner to pay
the reasonable attorney's fees expended by the prevailing party in that action,
if the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted in
<rood faith.
History: R.S. 1898 & l \ L , 1907, & 1212; L.
1909, ch. 109, $ 4; C.L. 1917, § 3000; R.S.
1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 3;
1975, ch. 81, § 1; 1979, ch. 110, § 1; 1984, ch.
13, § 1; 1985, ch. 72, § 1; 1985, ch. 100, § 1.
Compiler's Notes. — The 1985 amendment
by Chapter 7? *-oHT~»c Subjection ili which
formerly read as set out as the first three sentences of subsection (1> in the parent volume;
added Subsection (2); designated two undesignated paragraphs as Subsections (3) and (4);
inserted "In determining" and "the court" in
Subsection (4); redesignated former Subsections (2) and (3) as Subsections (5) and (6); divided Subsection (5) into two sentences, substituting "However, if the remarriage" for "unless
that marriage"; substituted "payment o f for
"in which case" in Subsection (5); substituted
"terminates upon establishment by the party
paying alimony" for "shall be terminated upon
application of that party establishing" in Sub-

section (6); divided Subsection (6) into two sentences, substituting "However, if* for "unless";
deleted "between them" after "association" in
Subsection (6); added "payment of alimony
shall resume" in Subsection (6); and made
minor rhanfroe jy; phraseology.
The 1985 amendment by Chapter 100 rewrote Subsection (1) which formerly read as set
out as the first three sentences of Subsection
(1) in the parent volume; designated two undesignated paragraphs as Subsections (2) and
(3); made identical changes in Subsections (2)
and (3) as those made to Subsections (3) and (4)
by Laws 1.985, Chapter 72; redesignated former Subsections (2) and (3) as Subsections (4)
and (5); made identical changes in Subsections
(4) and (5) as those made to Subsections (5) and
(6) by Laws 1985, Chapter 72; added Subsection (6); and made minor changes in phraseology.

ANALYSIS

Alimony.
—Amount.
—Modification.
—Termination.
Bankruptcy.
—Effect upon divorce decree.
Children.
—Custody.
Modification.
—Support.
Failure to pay.
- —Modification.
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